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We examine for the first time the association of  different measures of  ownership and control, and separa-
tion ratios with firm’s value and performance for 108 non-financial firms that traded their stock during the
period 1998 to 2002. We found that large blockholders exert a positive influence upon firm’s valuation and
performance, which validates the positive monitoring approach of  large shareholders, but also found that this
relation is not monotone implying that when separation of control and ownership tends to increase, a negative
effect is exerted on firm’s valuation. Furthermore, we report first estimates of  a survey of  corporate governance
practices conducted in 2004 for 43 Colombian non-financial companies. The index’s scores suggest that imple-
mentation of  good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor as measured by the average of  the
Index that is below half  the maximum attainable value. Regrettably, we did not find any support to recent
theories that predict a positive association between good governance practices, measured by the CGI, and
performance. At most there exists a positive relationship for sub-index but the results were not statistically
significant in general.
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RESUMEN
En este documento, se examina, por primera vez para el caso colombiano, la asociación que diferentes medidas
de propiedad y control y las razones de separación tienen con medidas de valoración y desempeño de 108 empresas
no financieras que transaron sus acciones durante el período 1998-2002. Encontramos que los grandes accionistas
ejercen una influencia positiva tanto sobre el valor de la empresas como sobre el desempeño, lo que valida el
enfoque positivo de supervisión que realizan los grandes accionistas, pero también encontramos que dicha relación
no es monótona lo que implica que cuando la separación entre las medidas de propiedad y control tiende a
aumentar, se produce un efecto negativo sobre el valor de la empresa. Adicionalmente, presentamos los primeros
estimativos de prácticas de buena gobernabilidad de una encuesta realizada en el año 2004 a 43 empresas
colombianas no financieras. Los índices sugieren que la puesta en práctica de una buena gobernabilidad por parte
de las empresas colombianas ha sido lenta y pobre medida por el promedio del índice que no llega a ser la mitad
del máximo alcanzable. Desafortunadamente, no encontramos ningún sustento a teorías recientes que predicen
una asociación positiva entre prácticas de buena gobernabilidad, medidas por el CGI, y el desempeño contable de
las empresas. A lo sumo, puede existir una relación positiva entre algunos de los sub-componentes del índice pero
los resultados no fueron en general estadísticamente significativos.
Palabras clave: Ownership, Control, Corporate Governance, Colombia
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1. INTRODUCTION
The analysis of corporate governance systems has attracted attention in recent years. Some
studies have looked at the connection between ownership structures and performance while
more recently others have focused on the relationship between corporate governance indexes
at firm level and firm’s valuation and performance. In the first type of papers, researchers have
tested two opposite effects of ownership upon performance. On one hand, large blockholders
with good information on their firms have incentives to monitor managers and then to mini-
mize agency problems of management entrenchment. This monitoring effect is positive. On
the other hand, large blockholders’ incentives may be in opposition to those of minority. Some
of these incentives can be building empire, excessive risk-taking and the like. This has been
named: tunneling effect, which is of course negative upon firm’s valuation and performance.
The second type of research has studied firm-level corporate governance mechanisms, and
most of them have focused on cross-country analysis where the emphasis is on the effect upon
governance of the legal systems across countries. La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer (1999)
argued that investor’s protection tends to be greater when legal environment is stronger and
therefore his willingness to invest tends to increase. That research has tested whether corporate
governance helps explaining firm’s valuation and performance and they have found a strong
positive association.
In this paper, we address both types of research. We first report results that link different
measures of ownership and control, and separation ratios with firm’s value and performance
for 108 non-financial firms that traded their stock during the period 1998 to 2002. After con-
trolling for a variety of control variables, we find evidence that large blockholders exert a
positive influence upon firm’s valuation and performance, which validates the monitoring ap-
proach, but we also found that this relation is not monotone implying that when separation of
control and ownership tends to increase, a negative effect is exerted on firm’s valuation.
Then, we report first estimates of a survey of corporate governance practices conducted in
2004 for 43 Colombian non-financial companies. These practices are turned into a corporate
governance index, CGI that includes information on six different aspects: independence, ac-
countability, fairness, responsibility, transparency and, discipline. The results suggest that imple-
mentation of good governance in Colombian firms has been slow and poor as measured by the
average of the Index that is below half the maximum attainable value. Colombian stock market
is very undeveloped and is being shrinking if one measures it by the number of firms that have
traded their stocks in the last five years. We then, try to address the question of whether better
governance practices lead to better (accounting) performance. Using standard OLS and cor-
recting for endogeneity, we found very disappointing results. Performance is not explained by
good governance practices. This is the first attempt that has been made in Colombia to trying to
verify that hypothesis, and nonetheless, we believe this research is helpful in the understanding
of corporate practices in emerging economies like Colombia.
This paper is divided in four sections. In the following section we make a theoretical review
of relevant literature on the relation between ownership, control and firm’s valuation and per-
formance and present three of our working hypothesis. In section III, we present sample selec-6 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
tion, regression specifications, data description, main econometric findings, and present our
four hypotheses. Section IV concludes and suggests some policy implications.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND WORKING HYPOTHESIS
Two of the most important features of modern corporations in most economies are the
separation of ownership and control, and concentration of equity among shareholders.  Berle
and Means (1932) characterized the modern corporation in the US as the diffusion of equity
among a large number of small investors none of which could individually take control over
the corporation. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and  Shleifer (1999) found that such characteriza-
tion did not apply to other economies, except the United Kingdom. Their work clearly shows
that modern corporations around the world exhibit very high degrees of ownership concentra-
tion and a strong separation between cash-flow rights and control rights.
Agency problems arise in any of the above types of characterizations. On one hand, the type
of corporations found by Berle and Means (1932) suggest that management can be the ultimate
controller of the firm and then they may create some forms of agency problems. Since small
individual and dispersed shareholders could not embark on monitoring managers, due to a free-
riding problem, managers with a very small ownership or no ownership at all became the ulti-
mate controllers of firms.  Management entrenchment turned to be the extreme form of this
agency problem. On the other hand, when ownership is very concentrated new types of agency
problems appear. Concerns are now related to the divergence of interest between block-holders
and minority shareholders. Large shareholders can transfer “resources from the firm for (their)
own benefit through self-dealing transactions …but also asset sales and contracts such as trans-
fer pricing advantageous to the controlling shareholding, excessive executive compensation,
loan guarantees, expropriation of corporate opportunities and so on… and the controlling
shareholdings can increase their share of the firm without transferring any assets through de-
lays in share issues… insider trading …or any other financial transaction that discriminate
against minorities (Johnson 2000, 22-23). This kind of conduct has been called “tunneling” or
search for private benefits of control (see also Bertrand, Paras, and Mullainathan 2002, and
Holderness, 2003).
On a different perspective, some authors have argued that large blockholders can have a
positive effect on firm’s valuation and performance. For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1986)
argued that, under the assumption that large shareholders are disconnected from management a
large shareholder with a stake large enough in a company would have incentives to carry out
some monitoring activity over the incumbent management. Hence some degree of ownership con-
centration could improve control on management and so increase firm value. This second conduct
of large blockholders is the monitoring over management view that clearly must have a posi-
tive effect.
Furthermore, it has also been extensively documented (see La Porta et al 1999, Barca and
Betch 2001, Denis and McConnell 2003, Holderness 2003, Chang and Choi, 1988, Ghemawat
and Khanna, 1998, Khanna and Palepu, 2000a, and 2000b; Bianco and Casavola, 1999,LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 7
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Khanna and Rivkin, 2001, and Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002)) that besides the fact most of firms
are owned by large shareholders, they in most cases belong or make part of business groups.2
This dimension of ownership can deepen the agency problem of tunneling outlined at the end
of the above paragraph. However, as Khana and Palepu (2000a) have found firms associated
to business groups can enjoy some benefits, what they call the value added approach of being
part of a group due to reduction in transaction costs, better chances of getting financial re-
sources in very illiquid capital markets, reduction in diversification costs and the like.
Therefore, from a theoretical perspective, there is not ex-ante any unambiguous effect that
should dominate. It will depend on whether the monitoring effect (positive effect), that sup-
pose large block-holders can induce large profits and better share prices, will outweigh the
tunneling or rent-extraction effect (negative effect), i.e., that blockholders will be rent-seekers
and then be highly risk averse. In the last few years, research has been intense trying to see how
those agency problems have operated in firms in developed and developing countries. In par-
ticular, it has focused on how ownership relates to firm’s valuation and performance. Results
have been mixed validating either the so-called tunneling view, or the monitoring effect, or the
value added approach. For instance, on the negative side, for US corporations Demsetz and
Lehn (1985), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) found that, after controlling for capital struc-
ture, firm size, stock market risks, and other variables, ownership structure had no significant
effect on firm performance. Gibson (2003) investigated the role of large shareholders in emerg-
ing market corporate governance, where he defined a large shareholder as one who directly
holds at least 20% of the firm equity (p. 244). He found (Gibson, 245) that the “link between
earning/assets or the change in earnings/assets and CEO turnover is statistically significantly
weaker at firms with a large shareholder.” This result suggests that the existence of large share-
holders within a firm has a negative effect on corporate governance.
Lehman and Weigand (2000) also found a negative effect of ownership concentration on firm
performance (ROA) for 361 German companies (183 of them listed companies). Yurtoglu
(2000) in a study of Turkish corporate governance also reported, for a sample of 257 listed
companies in 1998, that high stakes of ownership and pyramidal structures have a negative
effect on performance measured by ROA and market to book ratios and dividend payments,
although this effect is small.
On the positive effect side, the monitoring, or the value-added approach, Wiwattanakantang
(2001, 325) using firm-level data for 270 non-financial listed companies in 1996, found for
listed Thai firms that the presence of controlling shareholders is not “detrimental to the corpo-
rate value.” On the other hand, Gispert (1998, 534) studying the Spanish case also found that
2 Of course, literature has also acknowledged that some of main rationale to create business groups is finding ways
to retain more control through different ownership schemes. Larger stakes in a company have not been the only
way to retain control and reduce managerial rent-seeking though. As the literature in the subject has shown (see
Betch and Mayer 2001, 7-12), incumbent shareholders can retain control by issuing dual shares, or shares with
limited (or none) voting rights, by pyramidal schemes by which a holding company controlled by the controlling
shareholder holds shares in the company, or by cross-shareholdings.8 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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“rotation of board members is inversely related to firm performance, and therefore large share-
holders discipline board members as happens in other countries with similar dominant ownership
structure.” Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) examined the relationship between ownership struc-
ture and firm value for a sample of 214 companies for eleven European countries. Controlling
for nation effects and for system effects (stock market efficiency, or the level of investor pro-
tection), and using simultaneous equation approach, they found that ownership concentration,
measured by the fraction of shares held by blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. Chen
(2001) examined the relation between ownership structure and performance for a sample of
434 manufacturing firms listed on the Chinese stock exchanges, and found that ownership
measured by the top one shareholder is not statistically significant in explaining valuation of
firms but when he uses ownership concentration by the ten largest stockholders, then a positive
relation is found, validating the value added approach.
Empirical works on the effect of firm’s affiliation to a business group has also flourished
recently. Earlier studies on the subject were made on samples of Korean corporate firms
(Chaebols) (see Chang and Choi, 1988) and Japanese corporate firms (Keiretsus) and showed a
positive relationship between being part of a Chaebol (or Keiretsu) and economic performance,
measured by the average annual rate of profits. Later, Bianco and Casavola (1999) for the
Italian case tested how the identity of a controlling shareholder and his belonging to a business
group affected company performance. They found that the identity of the controlling share-
holder has a (weak) positive effect on performance suggesting that monitoring prevails. How-
ever, they also found that firms belonging “to groups appear to be more prone to managerial
error and to have a lower return on investment (1065).”
More recently, Khana and Palepu (2000a) found, for Indian groups that there exists a
quadratic relationship between firm performance and affiliated group diversification. How-
ever, in multivariate regression analysis, their findings clearly suggest that as “group diversi-
fication increases, the performance of group affiliates declines relatively to that of unaffiliated
firms until the group reaches a threshold diversification level” (Khana and Palepu, 869).
Recent research on East Asian Economies has shown some inverse relationships. For in-
stance, Bae et al. (2002) test for Korean firms the two main competing hypotheses related to
business group: the value-added view and the tunneling view, and found that “minority share-
holders of chaebol affiliated firms lose from the acquisitions but the controlling shareholders
of these firms gain from them.” For India, Bertrand et al (2002) also shows that tunneling can
be more common within business group since the controlling shareholder(s) can transfer
resources, profit, etc, from firms where he (they) have low cash flow rights to firms where he
has high cash flow rights.
Claessens, Djankov and Klapper, (1999) found for a sample of about 1,000 firms in East Asia
and Chile that business groups are formed to diversify risks internally as firm’s market risks is
influenced by several factors. They note that, all in all, business groups are not beneficial to share-
holders. In a similar study by Khanna and Rivkin (2001) for 14 emerging economies, that includes
five Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru, the authors found mixedLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 9
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effects of belonging to a business group: group affiliates enjoy higher profitability than unaffili-
ated firms for three countries: weaker results for another three countries, including Peru; for
Argentina, group firms appear to perform worse than independents; and a less weaker (negative)
result for the rest of countries, that include Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
Holderness (2003) in a very illuminating survey on blockholders and corporate control poses
four questions associated with blockholders: “How prevalent are blockholders? What moti-
vates block ownership? What impact do blockholders have on major corporate decisions? And
what impact do blockholders have on firm value?” (60-61). After reviewing some papers on the
subject, he concludes, mostly for the United States, as follows:
“i. Insiders own approximately 20 percent of a randomly selected, exchange-listed corporation
in the United States.
ii. Block ownership is motivated both by the shared benefits of control: blockholders have the
incentive and the opportunity to increase a firm’s expected cash flows that accrue to all
shareholders; and by the private benefits of control: blockholders have the incentive and the
opportunity to consume corporate benefits to the exclusion of smaller shareholders.
iii.Surprisingly few major corporate decisions have been shown to be different in the presence
of a blockholder. One exception is that external blockholders appear to monitor the form
and level of managerial compensation. Conversely, there is little evidence that blockholders
affect leverage.
iv. Ownership concentration appears to have little impact on firm value”.
In what follows, we present the main hypotheses related to the effects of block-ownership
on firm valuation and performance that we will test empirically in the econometric section. We
leave for the Corporate Governance Index section, literature review and the hypothesis that in
this regard will be tested.
HYPOTHESES:
Gutiérrez, Pombo and Taborda (2005) show that ownership concentration in Colombian
listed companies is high measured either by the percentage of the largest shareholder, CR1, or
by CR4, the blockholding of the four top shareholders. They also present the first results of
separation between cash-flow rights and control rights for both affiliated and unaffiliated firms,
and found that this measure is high for affiliated firms (and for unaffiliated ones too). That
paper leads us to pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Higher cash-flow rights (direct ownership) and direct voting rights by the four
largest controlling shareholders are associated with higher corporate valuation and better per-
formance.
Hypothesis 2 Higher separation of voting from cash flow rights by controlling shareholders
is associated with lower corporate valuation and worse performance.
Hypothesis 3 Affiliated firms with one or several controlling shareholders display higher
valuation and better performance than non-affiliated firms.10 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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3. EMPIRICAL DESIGN, SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA
This section describes regression specifications, the resulting samples of firms chosen, their
sources and selection, and the construction of main variables. It also describes briefly the con-
struction of the data on ownership and control structures and separation ratios between own-
ership explained in more detail in Gutiérrez et al. (2005).
3.1 REGRESSION SPECIFICATION
Two types of specifications will be tested. On one hand, we will look for factors that deter-
mine valuation and performance measures. On the other hand, we will look at what can explain
corporate governance measured by an index constructed with a survey. In both cases, we will
make use of some variables that capture some corporate governance mechanisms like owner-
ship and control, and the Colombian corporate governance index (when applicable) while con-
trolling for industry and other standard control variables. The following cross-section regression
will be estimated for one of the three samples:
2
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(1)
where Valuation (or performance3) is either Tobin’s q, market to sales, MTS, and market to
book ratio, MTBR, respectively; α , a constant; OWN, direct ownership by fourth largest share-
holders; (OWN),3 is ownership to the square; Wedge is a measure of separation of control
rights from cash-flow rights. This measure takes the inverse of the sr1 to get the estimates;
BGA is affiliation of a firm to a business group; Lyears is number of years a firm has been
listed. X’s are control variables; K, the number of control variables; SIC, industry dummy; i,
firm; and e, is an error term.
Equation (1) is estimated for three different samples that are explained in detail below. We
estimate the regressions using pooled-OLS, FGLS and panel data  depending on the structure
of the data set and variables available. For instance, for the small sample of 40 firms that
responded the questionnaire of corporate governance, we cannot perform FGLS since we have
just one observation per firm. On the contrary, for the balance panel data of firms for the
period 1996-2002, we can run FGLS and panel data  regressions.
To assess the relation between corporate governance index and firm attributes, we run each
firm’s corporate governance score on other attributes of governance, and we control for other
characteristics of firm, and estimate the following equation
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3 When the dependent variable is a performance variable, we will use returns on assets, ROA, or returns on equity,
ROE. As explained in the main text, Tobin’s q demands having some market valuation on common stocks which
unfortunately is not available if firm’s stocks are not listed.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 11
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where the vector X contains a set of further control variables. As Durnev and Kim (2005)
stress, we must be cautions in drawing inferences with the results of this equation because of the
potential problems of endogeneity. Nonetheless, in order to reduce endogeneity, we run regres-
sion using instrumental variables that will be detailed below as well as some robustness checks.
3.2 SAMPLE SELECTION
Main data was taken from Superintendence of Securities (henceforth SS) the regulatory
body responsible for inspecting and overseeing Colombian publicly listed companies, supple-
mented with data from Superintendence for Commercial Enterprises, the body responsible for
overseeing other large non-listed companies. Data from both sources provided information on
main twenty largest stockholders (whenever it was the case) and financial statements for a com-
plete sample of 108 Colombian non-financial firms that had their stocks traded in the stock
exchanges for the period 1998-2002.
For this research, we grouped three different data samples. For the first sample, we took all
Colombian non-financial companies whose stocks were traded at least once in a year during
1998 to 2002. It means that we included in this sample all Colombian companies that traded
their stocks during that period and took the year(s) when the stock was actually traded, and
excluded those years when their stocks were not traded. We do so for the following reasons.
First, Colombian companies can issue several types of securities like stocks, bonds, and com-
mercial papers. However, only stocks are securities that have variables returns that depend on
how well a firm is managed and how well its corporate governance is. Bonds and other types of
fixed return securities can be assimilated to banks loans. Second, reliable data for (average)
annual market prices of stocks is almost non-existent or hard to get for years other than the
period selected. Since one of the objectives of this research is to test how valuation-firm mea-
sures (like Tobin’s q) are related to ownership and other control variables, we had to get the
stock market prices, and that was only possible for firms that satisfied the first and second
points. Third, we constrained data to just the year(s) were the stocks were actually traded at
least once during that year, making it a complete unbalanced panel. The rationale for do this
stems from our interest in studying how the relationships of interest evolved during that period
for firms that traded their stocks all the five years versus those that traded them four or less
years. For all samples, we determined the primary industry in which each firm operated using
the United Nations’ two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system.
For the second sample, we stick to the same 108 firms but expanded the number of years to
make the panel as balanced as possible. Thus, for all companies we took 1998 as the starting
point of research regardless whether the firm had (or not) its stocks listed that year or whether
they were traded.4 This makes the panel a balanced one. However, not for all firms the data
goes from 1998 to 2002 since some of them were just created during that period and corre-
spondingly their panel can be lesser. One important implication of this second sample is that
we can observe how different performance and ownership relation differ when firms’ stocks
were listed against when they were not. The drawback of this sample is that we cannot estimate
a firm valuation measure like Tobin’s q since for some firms and some years, market prices are
4 However, we have not been able to determine for some firms whether for the years 1996-7, those firms were listed
in the stock exchange for issuing securities other than shares.12 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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not available. To overcome this, we rely on more general accounting measures like return on
assets, ROA, and return on equity, ROE. We will explain that in more detail below.
The last sample is composed of merely 43 firms that were listed in Colombian Stock Ex-
change for the years 2003 and 2004. That number is not arbitrary though. It resulted from the
number of companies that kindly responded a questionnaire about corporate governance prac-
tices from a universe of about 99 non-financial firms.
Regardless of the sample, some criteria were used to exclude firms from the analysis. The
first one refers to the exclusion of financial firms, regrettably very important in a small stock
market like the Colombian one, and public utilities companies. Main reason is that this type of
corporations is subject to very specific regulations and so their performance and valuation
measures are not strictly comparable. Lastly, we excluded some firms whenever we could not
find reliable information either on stock prices or financial statements.
3.3 DATA
3.3.1 OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL DEFINITIONS
Berle and Means (1932) stressed the difference between ownership and control. In their
work, they estimated separation of ownership and control among the 200 largest American
corporations. For them, it was clear that “Since direction over the activities of a corporation is
exercised through the board of directors, we may say for practical purposes that control lies in
the hands of the individual or group who have the actual power to select the board of directors
(or its majority), either by mobilizing the legal right to choose them –“controlling” a majority of
the votes directly or through some legal device –or by exerting pressure which influence their
choice” (page 69). However, corporate research for many years focused only on the structure
of corporate ownership putting aside the overwhelming differences between control and owner-
ship. In the United States, the main early works were conducted by Demsetz and Lehn (1985),
and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) who used ownership corporate estimates to test whether
such measures had any bearing on corporations’ profitability. Prowse (1992) conducted a simi-
lar research on Japanese corporations.
More recently La Porta et al. (1999) came back to the seminal analyses of Merle and Means
by looking at what they called ultimate owners. In their words (page 476) “…a corporation has
a controlling shareholder (ultimate owner) if this shareholder’s direct and indirect voting rights
in the firm exceed 20 percent.” That percentage was estimated following a chain of control’s
links of votes. Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) also studied the separation of owner-
ship and control and used a slightly different measure than La Porta et al. They estimated the
separation ratio as follows: “suppose that a family owns 11 percent of the stock of firm B. We
then say that the family controls 11 percent of firm B –the weakest link on the chain of control
rights. In contrast, we say that the family owns about 2 percent of the cash-flow rights of firm
B, the product of the two ownership stakes along the chain.” In both studies, researchers used
different cutoff points to determine effective control.
In this research, we follow a more thorough approach based on an input-output methodology
that renders not only the ultimate owner, as in La Porta et al. (1999), but also any blocks of se-
lected ultimate owners (see Brioschi, Buzzachi and Colombo, 1989, and Ellerman, 1991, and theLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 13
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recent papers by Chapelle and Szafarz, 2002, and Chapelle, 2004). Gutiérrez et al. (2005) provide
a thoroughly detailed explanation of the methodology and present general estimates for a sample
of about 148 Colombian companies some of which will be used here when testing our hypothesis.
The first variable estimated is direct ownership stakes (cash-flow rights) held by the largest,
the two largest, the three, the four, and the ten largest shareholders (CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4,
CR10). To assess potential non-linearities, we also include concentration ratios to the square
(i.e., [CR4]2). The input-output methodology also allows to estimate what it is known as the
integrated ownership (direct and indirect voting rights) and with this and the directed owner-
ship we estimated different measures of the separation ratio for the whole number of share-
holders, for the largest one, for the two largest ones, and the four largest one. We denote by srn,
sr1, sr2, sr4, the ratio of cash-flow rights to voting rights of the ultimate, the two largest, and
four largest blockholders respectively. The separation ratio between ownership and control
goes from zero to one; it is equal to one when the separation is zero and one when it is nil. By
assumption, firms that do not belong (or were not identified as belonging) to any (known)
business group get one. Lastly, following Claessens et al. (2002), and with the above informa-
tion, we estimated three additional wedge variables. The first one is the difference between
control rights and cash-flow rights, we called Dif1. This is a continuous variable. The second
one, Dif2, is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if control rights exceed cash-flow
rights, and zero otherwise. The last one is, Dif3, a dummy variable that takes the value of one
if ownership stakes exceeds control rights of a given number of chosen shareholders and if this
difference is above the median separation, and zero otherwise. These variables can be con-
structed for the (difference of ownership from control) top one, the top two, the top three
shareholders and so on. We chose to construct it only for the four largest shareholders.
Given some constraints on disclosure of information, we are not able to provide names of
individuals as ultimate owners, and we did a taxonomy regarding whether a firm is widely held
or closed. This last information is only available for the econometric exercise of relating gover-
nance and performance. In our empirical section, we will include dummies to account for firm
affiliation to a business group and for the presence of a foreign stockholder among the five
largest shareholders in each firm.
3.3.2 VALUATION AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Our study is focused on Colombian listed firms during the period 1998 to 2002 supplemented
with a preliminary analysis of a survey of corporate governance practices for the year 2004. Our
main data set is then composed of those firms that traded their stocks in at least one year during
1998 to 2002. The main reason to get this sample was to estimate market valuation measures like
Tobin’s q.5 To estimate Tobin’s q, we follow Black, Jang, and Kim (2003) who defined it as the
ratio between market value of assets to the book value of assets. As in the case of Korean firms,
Colombian accounting and tax regulations require that all firms update their book values yearly,
so the use of book value of assets must be very close to replacement costs. Market value of assets
5 Average market prices for Colombian firms are not quite updated and data sets usually present some differences.
When a firm is not listed in the stock exchange, or retired,  its market price is not reported and then any market
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was estimated as the sum of book value of debt plus book value of preferred stocks plus market
value of common stock. In turn, the yearly market value of common stocks was calculated as the
product of the average market price times the number of common stocks. The book value of
liabilities (in Colombian pesos) was taken as the book value of debts.
Researchers in the field of finance have recently suggested that for emerging economies,
Tobin’s q could not be a good indicator of firm value given some measurement problems. They
have proposed further related value measures. The first one is market-to-book ratio, MTBR,
defined as the ratio between market value of common stock (as defined above) and book value
of common stock; this latter estimated as the sum of the book value of assets minus the book
value of liabilities minus the book value of preferred stock. The second measure is market-to-
sales ratio, MTS, market value of common stock divided by sales.
Unfortunately, firm market value cannot be obtained when firms are not listed or when they
delist or do not trade their stocks. Since two of our samples are composed of firms that fall in
either category, we also estimated two accounting performance measures like returns on assets,
ROA, and returns on equity, ROE, respectively following standard definitions.
3.3.3 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF OWNERSHIP, VOTING RIGHTS AND SEPARATION RATIOS
Table 1 offers the reader a general view of our statistics on ownership, voting rights and
separation ratios. The first two columns show industry classification and the number of firms in
each of them. Then, it presents averages of main ownership and control variables. These are
the cash-flow rights (CR1, CR2, CR4, CR10), the control rights (Voting 1, Voting 2, Voting 3,
Voting 4) for the largest, the two largest, three and four largest shareholders. After them are
the ratios of separation between ownership and control (SR1, SR2, SR3, SR4); the wedge at the
cutoff point of ten percent; and three variables closely related to governance and ownership
and control: whether a firm is or nor affiliated to a business group, whether there is a foreign
investor among the five largest shareholders, and a variable that captures how much in a year
over the opened days of the stocks, firm’s stocks were traded.
On the average for the period 1998 to 2002, most listed firms were located in six out of twenty
industry sectors, a great deal of them in manufacturing sectors like manufacture of pottery,
China, glass, cement, plaster, food; beverage and tobacco, textile, wearing apparel and leather
products, and in financial-related sectors like investment funds. Direct ownership of the largest
shareholder, CR1 ranged, on average, between 12% in firms in agriculture, livestock, and for-
estry production to 56% in firms in public administration, education, community, recreational
and household services. Only in basic metal industries, the largest block-holder of those firms,
on average, was close of controlling directly the firm. Looking at the CR2, in about eight
sectors, the two largest shareholders had, on average, control of their firms. Control of the
firms by the four largest shareholders was guaranteed in eleven industries. And in only one single
sector, control was not obtained by the direct ownership of the ten largest shareholders. A
similar picture can be seen with the voting right variables but a bit more concentrated since in
fifteen sectors the four largest shareholders concentrated more than fifty percent of direct and
indirect votes. Firms affiliated to business groups were present in most sectors. In especial, we
want to stress firms in investment funds. The dummy has a value of one meaning that all ofLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 15
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them belonged to business groups. This is not surprising since these types of firms are the core
holdings of the groups. Foreign investors were very rare. In nine industry sectors, there was not
any firm with at least one single investor among the five largest shareholders. The presence of
foreign ownership was important in firms located in paper, paper products, publishing and
basic metal industries. Lastly, in just one single sector, wholesale and retail trade, firms’ shares
were actively traded during a year. In twelve industries, shares were very illiquid since they were
traded in less than ten percent of the number of days, the Exchange was opened.
Since association to a business group is a feature of listed Colombian companies, Table 2
reports the means and medians of the same variables presented in Table 1 but split in two
panels: firms that are affiliated, and non-affiliated to groups. There one surprising result is seen.
Non-affiliated firms are, on average, more concentrated and retain more control than affiliated firms.
The rationale can be that those firms may feel more insecure given the weak legal corporate
framework and so their float is very low. They just traded to comply with minimum regulations.
But more research must be done to find out what explains it.
3.3.4 OTHER VARIABLES RELATED TO FIRM’S GOVERNANCE
In section C.1 above, we described our measures of ownership, control and the separation
ratios. From the separation ratios, we follow Durnev and Kim (2005) and define Wedge, as a
dummy equal to one if control exceeds ownership in some percentage, and zero otherwise. Two
cut-off points were selected: 10% and 30%. The former is suggested by La Porta et al (1999),
while the latter was chosen because it is the average of the CR1 measure found in Gutiérrez et al.
(2005). A priori, one could either expect a positive or negative relationship with firm’s valuation.
Firm age is another control variable included in testing relationship between governance
measures and firm’s performance. It is said that older firms are likely to have lesser growth rates
and so should be valued less or have lower performance. Since data availability precluded us to
use that variable, we proxy it by using the number of years a firm has been listed in the stock
exchange, Lyears. Information on this variable was found in the Colombian Stock Exchange.
As in Black et al. (2003), we expect a negative relationship between it and valuation and other
performance measures.
Colombian capital market restrictions on foreign capital were eliminated by the early 1990s.
Recently, McKinsey & Company published the results of a survey. The survey gathered re-
sponses about investment intentions from over 200 institutional investors, who together man-
aged approximately US$3.25 trillion in assets. (See McKinsey & Company 2000, 1). Among the
main findings of that survey was that foreign investors would pay, for invest in Colombian
companies with good governance, an average premium of 27.2%. We control, then, for the
presence of foreign ownership, FO, among the first five largest shareholders using a dummy
with value one in case there was one, and zero otherwise.
Lastly, one mechanism of governance is the board of directors. For the small sample of
surveyed firms, we control for the size of the board of directors, Members. With respect to
the number of members of board of directors, results have been ambiguous (See Bhagat and
Black, 1999, and Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). In the questionnaire explained below, it was
asked how many members had the board. In Colombia, the board of directors is composed by16 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
its principals and its representatives, and since the Code of Commerce make all of them liable
as legal representative, we included the sum of them. We expect a positive relation with perfor-
mance due to the incentive effects of monitoring that the board exerts on management. Lastly,
Trading is a variable that is in percentage terms. It shows the ratio of the numbers of days a
firm’s stocks were traded during a year to the total days the stock exchange was opened.
3.3.5 OTHER CONTROL VARIABLES
Literature on corporate governance has determined a group of standard control variables
commonly used. All variables whenever be the case are expressed in Colombian pesos of 1998.
Sales and assets have been extensively used as measures of firm size. Some authors provide
good insights why this variable is a good control one. For instance, Klapper and Love (2004,
713) argue “the effect of size is ambiguous (on governance) as large firms may have greater
agency problems and, therefore need to compensate with stricter governance mechanisms.”
Durnev and Kim (2005, 1474) suggest, “Because larger firms tend to attract more attention
and may be under greater scrutiny by the public, size may affect governance structure.”
Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999, 364) state “Firm size has an ambiguous effect a priori
on the scope of moral hazard.” They argue that large firms are more prone to monitoring and
agency costs so (managerial) ownership should be greater. But, on the other hand, large firms
may have greater economies of scale in monitoring by large stockholders (management in their
case) and by rating agencies that may lead to a lower need of large ownership stakes in the firm.
We use primarily sales. Assets will be also used as an alternative. And as in most studies, firm
size enters as the natural log of the variable. We have then, for sales,6 LRSales, and for assets,
LRAssets (in 1998 Colombian pesos).
A second variable controls for firm’s investment opportunities. Klapper and Love (2004),
Black et al (2003), Himmelber et al (2001), and Durnev and Kim (2005) among others use
some type of average growth rate of sales. On the potential effect of this variable on perfor-
mance (and governance) Klapper and Love (2004) say that “small firms may have greater op-
portunities and, ...(may)…be in greater need for external finance and better governance
mechanisms.”  A positive relation with firm value would be expected.  To proxy for growth
opportunities, we then include a moving average of the three previous real annual percentage
growths in operating income,7 GrSales (in 1998 Colombian pesos).
Most research on the subject tends to control for intangibles too. Durnev and Kim (2005),
Black et al. (2003), Himmelber et al. (1999), and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) among others
controlled for what they call discretionary spending. In this category falls expenditures in R&D,
advertising, and the like. Most of the measures are flow variables but some authors also use
stock variables to proxy intangibles (See De Jong 2002). Since, we did not get financial reported
values for either R&D or advertising spending, we make use of the ratio between fixed capital
(property, plant and equipment) and operating income.  One should expect a negative relation
with firm value since market can value intangibles more than what they meant in book values.
6 Actually, we make use of operating income instead of sales. The difference between these two variables is small
though.
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We include a control variable for leverage that we proxy as the debt-to-asset ratio, Debtratio.
The effect of leverage on firm value is ex-ante ambiguous.
We control for industry dummies, SICi, to account for differences in asset structure, market
competition, and other idiosyncratic aspects, which may affect firm valuation, ownership or
corporate governance. We classify industries with the 2-digit United Nations Standard Industry
Classification.
3.4 DATA AND CONSTRUCTION OF COLOMBIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX
3.4.1 SOME INSIGHTS
Fllowing Jensen (1993),  four mechanisms of corporate governance are worth studying. The
first one refers to legal and regulatory mechanisms; the second are internal ones; the third ones
are external mechanisms and the last ones are product market competition.8
However, is evident that for most emerging economies, the third, and the last mechanisms
are less valuable since the main mechanism of the third group, takeovers, are almost nonexist-
ent given the high degree of control among the largest shareholder(s), and for the four group,
one assumes that either in case of the agency problems of management entrenchment or in the
case of ownership concentration, firms are efficient under the market structure in what they
compete. Then, we are left with mechanisms belonging to the first two groups. Although, the
legal system within a country is given and is the same for all the firms, good governed firms in
weak legal systems like the Colombian case would try to differentiate from bad governed ones
going beyond the legal system. Or else, in more global and interrelated capital markets, firms
that want to get capital in external markets need to adopt internationally corporate governance
standards that are usually above the one imposed by domestic legal rules. Regarding the second
group, main mechanisms are: the board of directors, executive compensation and ownership,
minority privileges, and the like.
Research on corporate governance has been mostly conducted on mechanisms like owner-
ship and boards of directors. More recently, research on the field has turned to surveys to get
information of how firms set the different governance mechanisms included in groups one and
two. That information has come primarily of reports from specialized international agencies
like Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA), Deminor, Standard and Poor and others, which
calculate indices of corporate governance rankings. For instance, Klapper and Love (2004)
used the CLSA ranking as a proxy of the firm-level corporate governance for 495 companies
across 14 emerging economies. They then address the question of how performance at firm-
level is explained by that index. In a cross-country study on 859 firms in 27 countries, Durnev
and Kim (2005) also used the CLSA ranking as a proxy of firm corporate governance and
complemented it with the Standard & Poor’s measure of corporate disclosure practices (as a
proxy of firm disclosure) to test whether that index could explained (and was explained by)
firm’s performance.
8 A slightly different classification of mechanisms is found in Agrawal and Knoeber (1996). These are: shareholding
of insiders, institutions, and large block-holders; use of outside directors; debt policy; the managerial labor
market; and the market for corporate control.18 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
Country studies on corporate governance have not been abundant though. Drobetz,
Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004) constructed a corporate governance rating for 91 Ger-
man public firms. Using a questionnaire with a variety of corporate governance practices, they
look at how firms have complied voluntarily with the recently issued German corporate gover-
nance code. They also tested how the index can explain firms’ performance and valuation
indicators. Black, et al. (2003) also constructed an index of corporate governance for a (very
large) sample of Korean listed firms from a questionnaire designed by the Korean Stock Ex-
change. In this case, the authors took the survey’s results and proceeded to design the index.
Black (2001) used a corporate governance ranking developed by a Russian investment bank to
test whether this ranking was correlated to firm value. The ranking ranges from zero to 60,
being 60 the worst corporate ranking. Finally, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, (2003) constructed
an index of corporate governance, for a sample of U.S. firms, based on some antitakeover
defense provisions in the line of the third group of governance mechanisms outlined above.
3.4.2 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX
In this research, we follow the common procedure of sending a questionnaire to Colom-
bian public companies based on a sample of questions designed by IADB project’s directors.
The questionnaire was clearly inspired upon CLSA questionnaire. There exist some key diffe-
rences though.
The first difference is who responded the questionnaire. In our research we sent them di-
rectly to main company’s officers while in the case of CLSA its own team of financial analysts
responded the questionnaires. The second aspect regards questions. In our questionnaire, ini-
tially, there were 67 questions organized around four criteria: general principles, senior manage-
ment and the board, shareholders and disclosure. The second criterion had 25 questions, the
third 20, and the remaining between the two others. Contrary to the CLSA there were not any
ex-ante weight assigned to any criterion.  However, the questionnaire was subject of revisions
or refinements after  we received them filled out and some questions were deleted.
 The third aspect is related to the way questions were posed. For instance, the way CLSA
posed some questions is “Is it true that there has been no controversy….?” A yes-answer is
then assigned a one and a no-answer gets a zero. In our case, unfortunately, some questions
were posed as “Has the board received any complains from shareholders in the last three years?”
(Survey question 32). It is clear that a yes-answer has to get less valuation than a no-answer. For
all other questions, a “yes” answer is interpreted as a pro-shareholder action and we assign it a
value of one.
Finally, for the final sample of questions, we made a couple of refinements in order to
reduce subjectivity and get a more robust index. First, we deleted some questions due to the
fact that they had no bite in Colombian corporate legal frame. One example is worth illustrat-
ing. The election of the external auditor is a responsibility of the General Assembly of share-
holders and so is not delegated to the board or any committee. There was a question regarding
the existence of a committee of selection of external auditor. Hence, this question and some
closely related did not make sense at all and were eliminated. To further reduce subjectivity
some other questions were erased due to the low o null variability of answers; were very con-LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 19
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fuse or ambiguous as to which answer indicated better governance; or overlapped highly with
other question(s). Second,  we bundle questions around the same criteria established by CLSA.
Hence, we have six criteria: discipline (4), accountability (2), responsibility (3), independence
(4), transparency (13) and fairness (5), where the number between brackets is questions for
each criterion. As a result of the refinements, transparency got a greater number of questions
while accountability had very low questions. After the final refinements, we have six sub-indi-
ces, each one standardized to have a value between 0 and 20. The sum over those sub-indices
gives the overall corporate governance index.9 Table 1-A in the appendix shows the questions
left and some statistics of the survey.
3.4.2.1 Sample of Companies
The number of non-financial companies registered as issuers of any kind of securities was
about 104 in 2004. Bearing in mind that, the questionnaires were sent to ninety-nine companies
that were (then currently) listed in the second half of year 2004 and that belonged to different
economic industries. The criteria of selection of firms were motivated by considerations like
size measured either by sales or assets, importance within a business group and its weight
within the Colombian stock market. The full list of companies that responded the question-
naire is in Table 3.
At first, a total of five companies refused to answer the questionnaire arguing that the infor-
mation was “confidential” a response that is at odds with the condition of being “a public
company”. Thirty-nine of the surveyed companies kindly responded the questionnaire. To get
a higher number of companies in the final sample, we proceeded to selectively fill out the
questionnaires for 10 of the companies that did not respond it. The criteria for selecting those
“extra” companies were the information publicly and non-publicly available we had gathered
and the quality of it. That leaves us with 49 companies who responded the questionnaire.
However, three companies belonged to regulated industries, and for other three, we could not
get financial statements. So at the end, the Colombian corporate governance index we present
comes from a sample of 43 non-financial firms (See Table 3).
3.5  SURVEY RESULTS OF COLOMBIAN CORPORATE INDEX
Table 4 reports the first results of a corporate governance index for listed Colombian com-
panies. The table has seven columns. The first six of them are the different sub-components
taken from CLSA classification. They are: discipline, accountability, responsibility, indepen-
dence, transparency, and fairness. The last column is the corporate governance index, CGI.
Looking at the table, the mean of the CGI, 49.9, it is clear that implementation of corporate
governance practices has been very poor among the sample of Colombian firms that responded
the questionnaire. In only one sub-index, accountability, the average (11.1) represents about
sixty percent of the maximum attainable (20) but that may be explained by the low number of
questions that component has (two). Independence and fairness are practices that seem not be
9 To obtain each standardized sub-index we multiply the raw sub-index by 20. Although this method introduces a
subjective weighting, it is a common procedure (See Black et al 2003).20 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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implemented by firms in this sample since averages are only close to thirty percent of the maxi-
mum attainable. Only half of the firms got average above 50 points.10 Table A-1 in the Appen-
dix presents information about the final questions from which we construct the CGI, and the
percentage of yes-answers each one obtained and their averages of the final 43 firms. To illus-
trate, only 9 firms had scores between 60 and 70 points; 12 where between 50 and 60; and 17
got scores between 40 and 50 points.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first make a statistical and graphical analysis of variables used in the
econometric section. Second, we report econometric results on the relation between firm valu-
ation and some measures of ownership and control, other governance measures and control
variables for the period 1998 to 2002 for firms that had their stock traded in the Colombian
stock exchanges. Then, for the same number of firms, we report results on the relation between
performance measures and ownership and control variables for the period 1998 to 2002, re-
gardless of whether their stocks were or not traded. Lastly, for a reduced sample of firms we
report the relation between performance measures and the governance index, and some other
governance and control variables.
4.1 STATISTICAL AND GRAPHICAL ANALYSIS
Table 5 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in one of the econometric regres-
sions. Panel A reports the statistics for the period 1998-2002 for the Colombian non-financial
companies that had their stock traded at least one year during that period.  In general, that table
shows some very general results. The most important is that ownership concentration has been
high since the CR4 is about 60% what must have given them full control of the company.
Separation of ownership and control is low. The separation ratio for the ultimate owner is about
0.92, where if the indicator is close to one it means separation is almost null. Tobin’s q is under
one what can be understood as a high perception of agency problems by market investors for
that sample of firms. Two interesting results are Trading and Bursat. The former shows the
average percentage of days a stock was traded in a year. It is about 0.17 what means that shares,
on average, had very low trading. Bursa is a variable that measures how much in terms of days
and number of shares; stocks were traded for a given company. 10 is the maximum level and
zero the minimum. The average is under 4 what again verifies the low liquidity of stocks of
Colombian listed firms during that period.
More striking results are seen in panel B11 that are worthy being commented. The first one is
the declining trend in the number of firms that traded their stocks. In 1998, there were 97 non-
financial firms that traded their stocks in the stock exchanges. That number decreased to 81 in
the following year, and in 2002, there were only 50 firms, a decrease of 47 firms: a reduction of
about 45% of companies in an already tiny market. The second result is the counter-intuitive
increase in stock trading (Trading increased from a low .13 to .24.). This could be explained by
10 Unfortunately, since we signed a confidentiality agreement with surveyed firms, we cannot report the names of them.
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two opposed forces. On the one hand, one could think that stocks with very low likelihood of
being traded quit the market; or on the other hand, that firms (stocks) that remained in the
market were the more active.
Apparently both forces operated. A standard test of equality of means of the two groups
of firms, (no presented) where one group is formed by firms affiliated to business group, and
the other by non-affiliated firms, shows that statistically both means are quite different.12 Then, the
variable trading could have increased because non-affiliated firms chose to put their stocks out
of the stock exchange. The third result is the declining trend in Tobin’s q, too. From a value
close to one in 1998, it steadily declined (year by year) to reach 0.72 in 2002, a too large
reduction in firms’ valuation. The fourth result is evolution of direct ownership concentration
by the top largest stockholders. the annual growth rate in sales (operating income) that firms
had during 1998 to 2002. During the period there was a slight increase in CR4 ratio.
Figures 1 to 4 plot the relationship between Tobin’s q and two variables of ownership and
control, sales growth, and ROA. All figures show a disappointing flat relation between Tobin’s q
and the variables chosen. These graphical results can be compared with correlations between vari-
ables shown in Table 5, Panel C. There it is evident that Tobin’s q is (very) weakly correlated with
all variables except with market-to-book ratio. In particular, the correlation between Tobin’s q and
ownership variables like CR2, CR4, SR1 and Wedge is weak but positive. Tobin’s q is negatively
related to the number of years a stock have been listed and with trading, the percentage of days
(over the maximum) a stock was traded (within a year).  And the relationship of ROA and ROE
with the rest of variables is also weak, although less, except with leverage, proxy with debt-ratio.
Figure 5 and 6 plot the association between Tobin’s q and two of the measures of direct
ownership, CR1, and CR4. Two different insights can be obtained. From Figure 5, it is apparent
that firm valuation slightly increases with the share of ownership stake of the largest share-
holder when this stake is less than 10% but decreases with a stake of 15%. It again increases
until it reaches 30% and falls again. From a higher stake (35% or more), the relationship is very
opaque, increasing and decreasing but seems, at very high levels to be inversely related. One
can think that the positive incentive effects of larger cash-flow ownership on firm value prevail
for some low ranges but in other ranges the negative effect prevails. The relationship is slightly
clearer when we look at the relationship between the stakes of the four largest shareholders and
firm valuation presented in Figure 6. There, it is clear that stakes higher than 35% are more
associated with higher Tobin’s q although again the relationship is not quite monotone. None
of the figures validate our hypotheses but help in explaining the association between ownership
and firm value. In the next section, we will address formally whether, when allowing for other
control variables, the relationship is positive or negative.
4.2 ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
4.2.1 FIRMS THAT TRADED THEIR STOCKS DURING 1998-2002
In the next two sub-sections we report findings for firms that traded their stocks at least once
in a year during the period 1998-2002. The data set is very unbalanced since some firms only
12 The average for trading of the business affiliated firms was 21.8% while for non-affiliated was only 4.5%.22 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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traded theirs stock a single year, others traded two, three or four years, and a small number traded
the five years. For this sample of firms, we ran pooled-OLS and corrected for heteroskedasticity.
The first subsection presents the findings using firm’s valuation measures: Tobin’s, market-to-
book ratio, and market-to-sales ratio as dependent variables, while the second presents the
findings for firm’s performance measures: ROE, return on equity, and ROA, return on assets.
4.2.2.1 Relation between Valuation Measures and Firm’s Ownership and Voting Rights
Tables 6 reports the results of regression (1) with Tobin’s q as dependent variable while Table
7 report the results for market to book ratio and market to sales. In Table 6, we present nine
different runs using a different set of control variables. In the first basic specification, we include
size of the firm, sales growth, debt-to-asset ratio, intangibles, business affiliation to a group,
presence of a foreign ownership, number of years the firm had listed their stocks, a recession
dummy, and industry dummies to capture some idiosyncratic characteristics of every industry
like technology, market competition and the like. The second one adds direct ownership stake
of largest four shareholders and its square to capture non-monotonicity. The third adds to the
previous the square of sales as in Himmelberg et al. (1999). The fourth and fifth specification
drops ownership variables and replaces them with voting rights of the four largest shareholders.
The sixth and seven run regressions following Claessens et al (2002) to control for different
wedge measures, and we include Dif1.  The last two regressions include Wedge10, a separation
dummy between control and ownership proposed by Durnev and Kim (2005). This set of
regressions tries to test hypotheses I to III above. There should not be significant colinearities
in the regressions since correlations among variables are very low.
The results of specifications (2) to (9) clearly validate hypothesis I. Regardless of the variable
of ownership or control taken, stakes of the four largest shareholders is Positively associated with
higher firm valuation at significant levels of ten percent or better. In all cases, the coefficients are
similar, ranging from a low 0.66 to a high 0.76, what shows the robustness of the results. The
magnitude of the coefficients also shows that the effects are economically very significant. For
instance, taking specification (2), a one standard deviation increase in ownership concentration
of the four largest shareholders induces a 0.066 increase in Tobin’s q, what represents an in-
crease of about 8 percent of the average Tobin’s q (0.82). However, the relationship is clearly
non-monotone since in all specifications increases in the direct stakes of ownership are nega-
tively associated and significant with Tobin’s q. Then, although the positive effect of ownership
over firm value is validated, there are thresholds after which firm value start declining. The com-
bining effect of ownership (CR4 and CR42) on firm’s value is negative but economically insignifi-
cant (-0.2%) what means a decrease of .0018 points over the mean of the Tobin’s q. Unfortunately,
hypothesis II is not validated in this specifications since we got positive relations in two of them
(6 and 7), and negative but statistically insignificant in other two.
Three other findings in (2) to (9) are worthy explaining. The first one refers to the positive
association found between firm affiliation to a business group (in all specifications) and firm
value. The coefficients are similar and economically significant what strongly validates our
third hypothesis. This finding is in line with the results of Arbeláez and Echavarria (2001) who
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firms did during the 90’s. The second finding is the coefficients found on the variable the years
listed. It is statistically significant in all regressions and negatively associated with firm value.
One can think that this result is counterintuitive since one could expect that the more years a
firm’s stock has been listed, the better would be firm value since firm reputation in the market
is consolidated and so is firm value. However, Black et al (2003) as well as other authors took
listed years as a proxy for age. In their insight, “more recently listed firms are likely to be faster-
growing…” Apparently this is also the case in Colombia. The third finding is the positive but
non-significant association between the recession dummy and firm value. One would expect
that a recession affect performance and then it would reflect into a lower firm valuation. The
reader must recall from Table 5 that Tobin’s q had a steadily declining trend13 during the period
under study regardless of the overall economic environment. Therefore, the positive associa-
tion stems from that declining trend.
Furthermore, other control variables were also significant. The debt-to-asset ratio was very
significant and positively associated to firm value in all regressions; and the capital intensity
variable was negatively associated to Tobin’s q.  With respect to debt-to-asset ratio, some theo-
ries have been posed to explain relationships. De Jong (2002) summarized theories explaining the
disciplinary role of leverage.14 There, he explains that leverage may be a device to discipline
the incentives that managers have to expand firm size and get private benefits from that
conduct. Debt must be paid out of the cash-flow the firm generates. On the other hand, lever-
age can generate opposite incentives to managers or owners given the existence of corporate
governance mechanisms. If managers want to retain control and increase firm’s size they are
forced to issue debt since issuing stocks will dilute their control. Disciplinary corporate gover-
nance devices like the threat of takeover also lead them to increase leverage.15 In the Colom-
bian case, (founding) owners have been afraid of losing control given the weak legal framework,
and has only traded historically a small amount of firm’s shares in the stock exchanges. They
have expanded firm’s size and retained control via leverage. Then, it is plausible to find a
positive relationship between leverage and firm value (See similar finding for the Korean case
in Black et at., 2003). The economic significance of this variable is high since it shows that a
one standard deviation increase in debt-to-ratio increases Tobin’s q by 0.07 points, a 9% in-
crease relative to the 0.82 sample mean.
With regard to the relation between K/S and Tobin’s q two aspects must be analyzed. The first
one is the expected negative association found. Bearing in mind that the indicator measures “the
alleviation of agency problems due to the fact that such assets are easily monitored and
provide good collateral” the negative sign means that the stock market values more the intan-
gibles of the firm that what is represented in book values. Another interpretation may be that an
intangible of the firms is their high collateralization of assets that helps leverage. The second
point is that magnitude of the coefficients was low. In any case, more research must be done trying
to disentangle this association.
13 During that period the guerilla intensified its attacks against the infrastructure and civil population and the weak-
ness of the government affected investors’ confidence.
14 This point of view stems from the theories of Jensen (1986) and Grossman and Hart, (1982).
15 This point of view is based on Zwiegel (1996) and Novaes and Zingales (1995).24 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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Finally, firm’s size measured by sales had always the expected negative association with
Tobin’s q, and in some of the regressions, the association was statistically significant. Larger
firms are assimilated to mature industries that have lower growth opportunities and so lower
market valuation. The moving average of sales growth in the past three years had also the
expected positive sign but in none of the specification it was statistically significant and the eco-
nomic magnitude of the coefficient was very poor. The presence of foreign ownership was
not significant and with the opposite expected sign. The number of years a firm has been
listed in the stock exchange was statistically significant in all regressions and with the ex-
pected negative sign. It is said that firms recently listed are likely to growth faster since they
have better future growth.
All the above results are very robust. From baseline specification (1) one can get the basic
values the coefficients of the control variables were when none of the ownership or voting
variables were added. The inclusion of these variables did not change any of the signs of the
coefficients of control variables and the magnitude of them remained. The R2 is a little bit
larger for specifications (2) to (9) implying that the inclusion of ownership and control account
for some slight but important differences in Tobin’s q.
With respect to the other two firm valuation measures, the market-to-sales ratio and the mar-
ket-to-book-ratio both presented weaker results. Table 7 reports six different runs. The economic
significance of ownership alone and with its square is very similar for MTBR to those found in
Tobin’s q although the statistical significances decreased for the CR4 variable. The table just
confirms that there is a non-linear relationship between market valuation and direct ownership
concentration. None of the wedge variables happened to be significant statistically. So hypoth-
eses II and II are weakly verified. Hypothesis III is verified for the MTS measure but not statisti-
cally for the MTBR. That is, business group affiliation in both cases leads to better market valuation.
The table shows other mixed results. Foreign ownership has the right expected sign with MTS and
statistically significant but a negative relation with MTBR. Leverage has a wrong sign association
with market to sales ratio. However, K/S keeps being negatively associates with these two mar-
ket valuation but the statistical significance is only valid for MTBR.
In sum, market valuations did seem to be affected positively with the level of ownership
concentration (and control rights) of the four largest shareholders suggesting that owners exert
a monitoring role over management. Firms affiliated to business groups are also more valued
and this is a very important fact. How to explain it? Once can think that investors want to
hedge against potential expropriation problems that arise in very weal legal and regulatory frame-
works. Since they bet that large owners will exert a monitoring effect on management and given
the high level of ownership, they do not fear too much any sizable tunneling effect. In next
subsection, we will report results for accounting measures of performance.
4.2.1.2 Relation between Performance Measures and Firm’s Ownership and Control
In this sub-section, we report the results of the equation (1) but taking performance mea-
sures, return on assets, ROA, and return on equity, ROE, instead of firm’s valuations. Some
findings validate the hypothesis 1. In particular, Table 8 reports four different runs for ROA
and for ROE. Specification (3) and (7) show economic importance of both CR4 and its squareLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 25
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although their statistical significance is lower than 10 percent. Hypothesis I is not verified with
this variable. However, taking as measure of governance, the percentage of control that top four
largest shareholders had, hypothesis I is validated (specification 4).  In this case, the statistical
significance is at 5% level or better for both control and its square; and as in the above Tobin’s q
findings, control concentration impacts positively the returns on assets of the firm (ROA) but this
relation is not monotone because its square is negative. Hypothesis II is also validated since one
of our measure of separation between control and ownership, Wedge10, is highly significant and
with its expected negative sign both for all ROA and ROE runs. Most of he remaining control
variables have the expected signs. Again, the association between ROA and the fact firms belong
to business groups is positive and statistically significant. This result verifies Hypothesis III. As
expected, the years when overall economy fell impacted negatively firms’ profits. The ratio of
fixed capital to sales is again negatively associated to both ROA and ROE.
The effect of control concentration on performance is very weak though. The coefficient of
voting rights (in run 4) is 0.027, and one standard deviation increase in the percentage of overall
control by the top four largest shareholders is associated with an increase in ROA by 0.0005, an
increase less than 0.01% with respect to the ROA mean. Robustness of results still keeps being
high since signs and magnitude of coefficients remain. Lastly, the R2 increases a little bit when
ownership and voting variables are included implying an overall positive contribution of those
variables to the model specification.
In summary, we presented results on firm’s value and performance that verify that large four
blockholders exert a positive effect on firm’s valuation and performance. However, the find-
ings also suggest that those same blockholders can affect negatively firm’s development if the
separation between cash-flow rights and control rights increases. The impact of ownership or
control is however very small. One additional important finding is that firms that were associ-
ated into a business group seem to be more valued by investors.
4.2.1.3 Results for the Firms during 1998-2002.
This subsection reports main findings for the same sample of firms above but expanding the
number of years for all firms whenever possible. To illustrate, Colombina is a Colombian firm
that was listed from 1998 to 2002. It had issued stocks and other securities but during that
period, it only traded their stocks in 1998.16 Then, in this subsection, it has 5 observations while
in the sample of the above section it only had one observation (1998). The objective of this
section is twofold. First we want to study how accounting performances of firms evolved
during a longer period for all firms regardless of whether their stocks were or not traded. To
account for this experiment, we included a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a firm
traded its stocks in a year, and zero otherwise. In the example of Colombina, we put a one in
1998 for the dummy variable, Stock listed, and zero in the other years. Since some firms did
not trade their stock all five years, we did not get market price of common stocks and so had to
rely on accounting performance measures like ROA and ROE. The panel is not balanced though.
Main reasons are: some firms were born during that period and immediately were listed, most
of them were in 1998; for some firms we could not get financial statements for the years other
16 The fact. that the stocks of a firm did not trade during a year does not mean that the firm’s securities are not listed.26 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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when they traded their stocks; and for some firms, financial ratios were outliers. The second
goal of this subsection is to test the robustness of the results found in the last subsection.
There we reported that hypothesis I, II and III were verified.
In that subsection, we used a complete set of control variables to control for potential
endogeneity of (blockholders) ownership with respect to the contracting environment.
Himmelberg et al (1999) argue that unobserved heterogeneity among firms can generate a
spurious association between ownership and performance and if so, validation of our hypoth-
eses would be null even with the presence of control variables that capture unobserved con-
tracting or market specific conditions. They suggest that endogeneity can be addressed in a
better way with the use of panel data techniques.
In Tables 9 and 10, we  report the findings for models (1) using ROA, and ROE as depen-
dent variables and running both FGLS and fixed effect panel data17 to follow Himmelberg et al
suggestion. Each table has two panels. The left panel reports the results when running feasible
generalized least square, while the right one reports results using fixed effect panel data. To
save space we will focus mainly in those variables related to our hypothesis and goals (in this
subsection) and leave to the readers to check the remaining findings. Firstly, in both panels,
hypothesis I is once more verified. Ownership by the four largest blockholders is positively
associated with better firm’s performance and its square is negatively related. The magnitude
of the coefficients is good and so is their statistical significance. Hypothesis II is verified in the
left panels. There we used three different measures of separation between control and owner-
ship, following Claessens et al. (2002). In specifications (3), Dif2, a dummy variable equal to
one if control exceeds ownership and zero otherwise, is negatively related to return on assets,
verifying that as firm’s wedge between control and ownership stakes increases, firm’s returns
fall. Hypothesis III is also validated. Firms affiliated to business group tend to get better ac-
counting performances.18 Lastly, all the regressions control for whether during a year the stocks
of a firm were or not traded, Stock Traded. One should expect that since public firms are more
scrutinized by regulators and private investors, they be more careful in risk-taking and so their
performance (and valuation) be better when their stocks are traded than when they are not
because public attention is over them and so must conduct better management and gover-
nance. Stock Trade has the expected positive relation with both accounting measures, and in
most cases there is a strong statistic significance validating our conjecture. However most re-
search must be done in better identifying the presumption and findings.
To summarize, for both accounting performance measures, controlling for unobserved het-
erogeneity, we can confirm the positive effect of ownership by largest shareholders on perfor-
mance but that the relationship is not monotone. The sub-section verified again that firm’s
performance falls whenever there is a separation between ownership and control. The positive
effect of firm’s affiliation to economic conglomerate is also confirmed. Our conjecture that
firms behave better when they face more accountability was validated but we think more re-
search is warranted.
17 We also run regressions using pooled-OLS. These are available upon request. The results validate all three hypothesis.
18 Coefficients for BGA are not reported in the right panel due to collinearity. They were automatically dropped.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 27
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4.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX AND PERFORMANCE 2003-2004
This subsection reports two main econometric specifications for the sample of 43 firms
that responded a questionnaire on corporate governance practices in 2004. The first section
report OLS regression results on the relation between the CGI and some control variables as
specified in equation (2) above. The second specification (equation 3 below) shows the rela-
tion between ROA and ROE measures and the corporate governance index while controlling
for some variables.
4.3.1 DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNANCE
Klapper and Love (2004, 706) raised the concern of the “likely endogeneity of corporate
governance practices.” They argue that “a growing firm with large needs of outside financing
has more incentive to adopt better governance practices in order to lowers its cost of capital.
These growth opportunities would also be reflected in the market valuation of the firm, thus
inducing a positive correlation between governance and Tobin’s Q.” To address this problem,
and given that their governance data has no time variation, as it is our case, they suggest that
to one way to eliminate or reduce such a problem, one must control using variables like size,
growth opportunities, and the rate of investment. As mentioned, we do not have any valuation
measure but only accounting performance measures that may be less prone to endogeneity but
nonetheless can suffer also from some type of endogeneity.
To address the problem, we employ the same set of variables as in the two previous sections
and run OLS corrected with heteroskedasticity. But before presenting econometric findings,
next sub-section provides a statistical and graphical overview of the potential relations on
main variables.
4.3.1.1 Descriptive Statistics, figures and Econometric Results
Table 11 presents in panel A the statistics of key variables, in panel B the matrix of correla-
tions between corporate governance index, control variables and ownership and separation
ratios, and in panel C we report correlations among subcomponents of the corporate gover-
nance index. The simple correlation coefficients between CGI and control variables like growth
of sales (in the two last years), size, proxy by log of sales, numbers of members of the board of
directors, and type of securities shown in Panel C are all positive and some of them significant.
As we expected, growth of sales is highly correlated with corporate index but less correlated
with our performance measures, ROA and ROE. However, other correlations are very low with
the governance index. The ideal would be that some of our control variables could be highly
correlated with our governance measure but weakly correlated with our performance measures
in order to be good instruments as tests of endogeneity.
On the other hand, correlations between our two performance measures and the corporate
governance index are disappointingly negative (-0.20) and (-0.19). These results can be confirmed
with Figure 7 and 8 that present plots of firm-level governance index plotted against returns on
assets and returns on equity. The relationship is (strongly) negative what is a disappointing finding
since it suggests that firms with better level of governance have on average worse performance,
a result contrary to the overwhelming evidence found in most of country studies.28 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
In Table 11, we report estimates of the governance model, equation (2) above. Growth of
sales in past three years maintains a consistent significant positive relation with the corporate
governance index. Size, proxy by natural log of sales is positively associated in all specifica-
tions but not significant. Furthermore, variables like the affiliation of firm to a group and
type of security issued (i.e., stocks versus other type of securities) were very sensitive to the
inclusion of other control variables changing signs in most cases or getting the wrong sign. Lastly,
in specification (4) and (5), we included two variables. The first one is CGC that takes a value of
one, if the firm voluntarily has issued a code of good corporate governance practices, and zero
otherwise. The second one is Bursatil, a variable that measures the level and intensity of stock
trading. Two insights are worthy to explore. First, coefficients of those two variables are very high
and positively associate to the corporate governance index. It means that firms that issued a
corporate governance code actually had better scores in governance practices. It also means
that firms that traded most their stocks also had better governance practices. The second insight
is that the R2 increased significantly when these two variables were added what might suggest that
they do help explain governance scores. However, further research must be done to find better
determinants. We ran various regressions using different sets of control variables, and results were
very sensitive and unstable for most of them except growth of sales, CGC and Bursatil.
4.3.2 GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE
In this section, we address the relationship between firm performance and firm-level gover-
nance while controlling for size, growth opportunities, ownership and separation ratios, and
some other variables. We will employ equation (3) below and run OLS taking ROA as the
dependent variable. In this section, all financial variables, like ROA, debt-to-asset ratio, natural
log of sales, among others, are the 2003-2004 averages. For variables like members of board of
directors, the data included correspond to the year 2004.
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where description of variables are like in equation 1, and the vector X includes variables like
members of board of directors, type of security a firm traded in 2004, and Bursatil in year 2003.
We would like to test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 Firms with better corporate governance practices reflected in an index must
display higher valuation and better performance regardless of their affiliation to a business group.
Most studies that tested this hypothesis have verified its validity (See, Black et al., 2003 for
Korea, Klapper and Love, 2004, for 14 emerging economies, Durnev and Kim, 2005, for 25
countries) and have implemented some endogeneity tests.
Table 13 reports the first set of results. There are three panels. In Panel A, we report the
results using OLS. In Panel B, we report the results correcting for endogeneity; and in Panel C,
we report result for one of the sub-indices of corporate governance index.19 In the first two
19 Results for the remaining sub-indices were not good and so they are not reported. The main point was that the
relationship between the sub-index and the measure of performance was negative and in some cases very significant.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 29
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panels findings are disappointing, in particular because the governance index is negatively and
strongly associated with ROA. Following standard procedures, we included different sets of
control variables that can be seen in specifications 1 to 3 in each panel. Regardless of the control
variables included, the relationship between our index of corporate governance practices and the
performance measure kept being strongly negative. In Panel A, sales growth was the only vari-
able that was always positively associated with ROA and statistically significant. Another vari-
able that has statistical significance is Listed Years  with a negative association what confirms
the findings for the period 1998-2002. To control for ownership, we included the percentage of
CR4 corresponding to average of years 2001-2002. In neither case CR lagged was significant
when entered alone or when entered with its square what is surprising given the strong associa-
tion found for the period 1998-2002. The remaining control variables like the wedge, Lyears,
Members were very unstable, changing the sign and being statistically insignificant most of the
times. To go further, we include three dummy variables that captures whether the firm’s ulti-
mate owner is a family, UOFF, a financial institution, UOFIF, or a foreign firm, UOFO. In
neither case the findings were either economical or statistical significant.
4.3.3 ENDOGENEITY CHECKS
A recurring issue in studies of the effects of firm-level corporate governance practices on
performance is the potential presence of endogeneity. For instance, firms with high market value
or better performance could implement good corporate governance rules, so the causation would
run from market value to corporate governance. Since implementation of such practices is costly,
only profitable firms would incur the costs, biasing the potential results upwards. Researchers
have suggested some ways to address this problem. Once is to include a robust set of control
variables that may be correlated with governance but being weakly correlated with valuation or
performance measures. Another way is to make use of panel data techniques as suggested by
Himmelberg, et al (1999). Lastly, researchers have made use of instrumental variables.
In Table 13, Panel A, we tried the first approach using different sets of control variables to
alleviate the potential endogeneity concern but as shown the results are counter intuitive for
the association between governance implementation and performance. Most of the control
variables did not either result statistically significant. Unfortunately, since our governance data
has no time variation we cannot employ panel data techniques. So, we proceeded to use instru-
mental variables, using a simultaneous equation model. A good instrument is one that is (highly)
correlated with the potential endogenous explanatory variable but that is weakly correlated
with the dependent one. The use of instrumental variables is constrained for the almost non-
existence of them. To address the problem of endogeneity, we recour to two variables that can
potentially be accepted as instruments: the first one is a CGC, corporate governance code, and
the second one is Bursatil.
In 2001, the Superintendence of Securities issued Resolution 0275 setting some minimum
standards of corporate governance practices Colombian listed firms must comply in order that
their securities can be acquired by Colombian pension funds. The set of standards is a code of
corporate governance rules that must be part of the statutes and rules of the firms. Since
pension funds have been acquiring securities from listed firms, the government thought that30 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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making voluntary the issuing of a code of good governance practices, firms in search of funds
would issue such a code in order to be eligible to sell their securities to pension funds. Hence,
one can expect that firms that have voluntarily issued a code of governance rules might have
actually implemented good corporate governance. Furthermore, the CGC is highly correlated
with the CGI, 0.45, and is also statistically significant as shown in Table 11, Panel C above. The
second instrumental variable was Bursatil, a variable that measures the trade intensity of stocks.
Again, one can expect that listed firms that traded continuously be more scrutinized by inves-
tors and regulators and so had in practice implemented better corporate practices. The correla-
tion of Bursatil with GCI is not so high, 0.29, and statistically significant.
In Table 13, Panel B, we report the results using Bursatil as an instrumental variable. De-
spite the higher correlation of CGC with the corporate governance index, regressions using this
variable gave coefficients of CGI negative and statistically insignificant. The results using Bursatil,
as instrument, are also disappointing. Better corporate governance practices apparently did
not lead to better returns on assets although the coefficients are not either statistically signifi-
cant at accepted level of confidence, and their economic significance is also very tiny implying
that implementation of better governance practices have not driven accounting performance.
This result is contrary to findings reported in the surveyed literature above where it has been
shown that, across countries, firms that adopted better corporate rules had, on average, better
valuation and performance. How to explain the result? We would forward some insights. First,
the reader must recall that the average of the CGI was about 50 points out of a maximum of
100; only one firm was close to get 70 points; half of the firms had scores greater than the
mean 49; and seven got scores between 30 and 40 points. Therefore, the index shows that few
firms, among the sample that responded the questionnaire have really worried to implement
good governance practices. Second, the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, locally known
as Confecámaras undertook in 2001 and 2002 the first surveys of leading CG indicators for
Colombian companies.20 Although the number of firms surveyed was very small and few details
of methodological aspects are known, the average score of the sample was also very low com-
pared to the remaining countries also surveyed in those works. In 2001, the overall index of
leading corporate indicators was 3.4 well below the average score of the top country in the
sample, 8.5. In 2002, using different and not comparable methodology, the average score ob-
tained by the participating Colombian firms was a bit better, 6.4 out of 10. In general, the
surveys reveal that apparently Colombian firms have not been too prone to implement good
corporate governance practices. Therefore, our results simply could be reflecting this conduct.
However, it is also disappointing that none of the control variables that helped explaining
valuation and performance during 1998 to 2002 were consistently statistically significant al-
though a couple of them had the expected sign, i.e., CR4 and its square, wedge10, Lyears, and
business group affiliation,  and BGA. Only the three years average of sales growth resulted
statistically and economically significant. Despite the unexpected bad results, we think that
endogeneity can be affecting our econometric results but more research and fine-tuning must
be done to understand what drives those counterintuitive results.
20 See Confecamaras 2001, and 2002.LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 31
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
To what extent is valuation and performance drive by ownership and control? Do firms
affiliated to business group perform better and have better valuation than unaffiliated firms?
Do the implementation of good corporate governance lead to better accounting performance?
The objective of this paper was to try to answer and verify those hypotheses. For the first time,
this subject is researched thoroughly in Colombia. The answer to the two first questions is
positive. We found evidence that cash-flow rights of the top largest shareholders are positively
associated with better firm’s valuation and performance but that relationship is not monotone.
We also found that wedge, or separation between cash-flow rights and voting rights has a nega-
tive effect on firm’s valuation and performance. We found strong evidence that affiliated firms
also enjoyed better market valuation and had performance. More research has to be done to
disentangle what explains it. We hypothesize that since Colombian legal and regulatory frame-
work is weak, measured by international standards, investors may have feared expropriation via
tunneling effects or management entrenchments. Since ownership has been highly and histori-
cally concentrated, they have realized that the second concern is not viable in Colombia, and
since firms have expanded via high levels of leverage, investors may have trusted firms affili-
ated to large and very influential politically business groups.
In our study, we did not find evidence that firms with better standards of corporate gover-
nance enjoy better performance despite recent efforts by authorities and regulators in promoting
better governance practices. The results of the survey shed some results. The most important is
that, on average, firms have been reluctant or very slow in implementing such good practices. This
result partially confirms other findings in Surveys conducted by the government and chambers of
commerce about the poor and low adoption of good governance rules by Colombian firms.
What can explain this conduct? The answer is complex and can be posed looking back at the
ways Colombian firms have traditionally financing their needs of capital expansion. In the expo-
sition of motives of the recently presented Bill of Capital Markets (2004) to the Colombian
congress, the Ministry of Finance reported that only large Colombian firms have made use of
bonds and other types of securities to finance their needs of capital and even for those firms
the amount collected by this type of financing have not represented, on average, more than 5%
of total financing. Medium and small firms did not make use of the capital markets when they
have looked for financing. Forty three percent of the financing of large firms have been made of
reimbursement of company’s profits and loans from suppliers. The remaining has been made
from financial obligations, mainly banking loans. This picture clearly shows that Colombian
listed firms, usually the largest Colombian firms, have not been and may not be very interested
in implementing better governance practices. Funds can be obtained through other sources
although it may be argued that at higher prices. It is not either surprising that most of listed
firms in the Colombian stock exchange belonged to business group, and it is less surprising that
investors acknowledge it by paying a small premium for the stocks of those companies because
those firms have traditionally faced less financial constraints.
The issuing of new regulations by Superintendence of Securities as well as the Bill on the
capital market presented to the Colombian congress can have little impact, if any, over the con-
duct of companies in adopting better corporate governance practices. It is overwhelming evident32 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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in all studies on the subject, that firms with better governance standards get, on average, better
valuation and performance, and so is understandable the attempts of the Colombian govern-
ment to encourage the adoption of such good practices by Colombian firms. The government
efforts look for better protection to investors, more disclosure of relevant and timing informa-
tion, and better information systems. To that end, they have proposed to put limit on the num-
ber of members of boards of directors, to get that minority shareholders have a greater presence
and voice in the boards of directors, and to increase the number of “independents” in the
boards of directors. These types of proposals follow general recommendations stemmed from
the seminal papers of La Porta , Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny  (1999b, 2000, and
2000b) and have been adopted by many countries around the world.
However, regulation has not addressed the two main stylized facts historically presented in the
stock exchanges in the last years. Listed firms (trading stocks) have been decreasing in number
and more and more the firms that remain in the stock market belong to business groups. It has
been very common to criticize business groups saying that they are the roots of all of the prob-
lems. Our research can just say that investors valued them more. Why the government has not
made any reference to this point?
We do not have any clue to answer it but would instead like to quote Bergloff and Von
Thadden (1999, 17) who argue “The relevance of shareholder protection laws for an assess-
ment of the workings of capital markets in such economies is problematic, because the group-
based corporate structure in developing economies is seen as just the response to missing capital
market institutions…Business groups, with all their opacity, lack of outside accountability,
insider dominance, and so on, at least do not seem to harm their own shareholders, given the
environment they operate in. More generally, we believe that corporate governance problem in
our broader perspective is an equilibrium problem: the absence of organized markets and small
investors give rise to substitute constructs such as business groups, but the existence of these
substitutes prevents capital market and marker base corporate shareholdings from emerging”.
More research on the subject is needed to address and understand the many complex rela-
tions that are present in today Colombian corporate system. This work is just one starting point
to formulate more hypotheses. But we do believe the study of corporate governance in Colom-
bian stock markets must be addressed within the context of business group affiliation.
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This table shows across industries averages of main ownership, voting and separation ratios between ownership and control for the sample of companies that traded
their stocks during the period 1998-2002. CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4 are percentages of direct ownership owned by the largest, the two, three, four and ten largest shareholders
respectively. Voting 1, Voting 2, Voting 3, and Voting 4 are the percentage of direct and indirect voting of the largest, the two, three, and four largest shareholders. SR1,
SR2, and SR4 show the separation between ownership and control for the largest, the two largest and four largest shareholders. Wedge10 is a dummy variable that takes
a value of one if control rights of the largest shareholder exceed cash flow rights by at least 10% and is zero otherwise. BGA is a dummy variable, with value equal to
one if the firm is affiliated to a business group, zero otherwise. FOwners is a dummy, with value one if there is one foreign stockholder among the five largest
shareholders, zero otherwise. Trading is a percentage that shows trading intensity of the stocks in a year. Raw data was taken from Superintendence of Securities.  The
industrial classification is based on The United Nations two-digit Standard Industry Classification.







4  SR1 SR2 SR4  Wedge 




11  17  0,12 0,20 0,27 0,31 0,14  0,23 0,30 0,32  0,93  0,94  0,90  0,33 0,94 0,00  0,00 
  21  4  0,43 0,63 0,77 0,93 0,57  1,05 1,16 1,25  0,73  0,60  0,62 1,00  1,00  0,00  0,05 
Coal, Metal ore, 
Stone Quarrying, Salt 
and Mineral Mining 
29  5  0,18 0,32 0,47 0,62 0,18  0,32 0,40 0,47  1,00  1,00  1,00  0,00 1,00 0,00  0,09 
Food, beverage and 
Tobacco  31  34  0,21 0,34 0,47 0,61 0,24  0,40 0,52 0,61  0,90  0,87  0,81  0,32 0,97 0,14  0,44 
Textile, Wearing 
Apparel and Leather 
Products 
32  28  0,30 0,47 0,59 0,75 0,33  0,53 0,65 0,75  0,97  0,94  0,84  0,07 0,71 0,00  0,07 
Paper, Paper 




Plastics and Rubber 
35  16  0,14 0,26 0,41 0,64 0,15  0,28 0,37 0,44  1,00  1,00  1,00  0,00 0,29 0,41  0,08 
Manufacture of 
Pottery, China, Glass, 
Cement, Plaster 
36  46  0,43 0,60 0,73 0,80 0,52  0,80 0,93 1,02  0,80  0,77  0,75  0,44 0,77 0,29  0,28 
Basic Metal 




38  19  0,44 0,60 0,70 0,76 0,47  0,71 0,81 0,85  0,96  0,90  0,88  0,11 0,74 0,37  0,05 
Construction and 
Public Works  50  11  0,18 0,30 0,47 0,67 0,18  0,30 0,41 0,48  1,00  1,00  0,97  0,00 0,36 0,00  0,01 
Wholesale and Retail 
Trade  61  14  0,29 0,48 0,60 0,69 0,30  0,51 0,60 0,67  0,92  0,96  0,93  0,14 0,79 0,36  0,53 
Wholesale and Retail 









































































































4  SR1 SR2 SR4  Wedge 




63  2  0,34 0,61 0,89 0,97 0,34  0,61 0,79 0,89  1,00  1,00  1,00  0,00 0,00 0,00  0,10 
Transport and 
Storage  71  8  0,16 0,26 0,43 0,68 0,22  0,38  0,50 0,60  0,78  0,78  0,79  0,63 1,00 0,00  0,15 
Communication  72  10  0,22 0,39 0,66 0,93 0,26  0,48 0,69 0,86  0,89  0,85  0,81 0,30  0,90  0,20  0,02 
Investment  Funds  81  43  0,23 0,34 0,46 0,61 0,25 0,40 0,50 0,58  0,88  0,86  0,83 0,37  1,00  0,23  0,29 
Real State, Renting 
and Bussiness 
Services 







93  28  0,56 0,74 0,84 0,92 0,56  0,74  0,81 0,86  1,00  1,00  0,98  0,00 0,18 0,36  0,02 
Other non-classified 
business activities  99  4  0,25 0,33 0,46 0,69 0,25  0,33  0,40 0,46  1,00  1,00  1,00  0,00 0,25 0,00  0,01 
Total   353  0,31 0,46 0,59 0,72 0,34  0,53  0,64 0,71  0,92  0,90  0,87 0,23  0,73  0,24  0,22 
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TABLE 2
This table shows means and medians of main ownership, voting and separation ratios between ownership and control
for the sample of companies that traded their stocks during the period 1998-2002. The information is presented for firms
affiliated to business groups, and for non-affiliated firms. CR1, CR2, CR3, CR4 are percentage of direct ownership owned
by the largest, the two, three, four and ten largest shareholders respectively. Voting 1, Voting 2, Voting 3, and Voting 4 are
the percentage of direct and indirect voting of the largest, the two, three, and four largest shareholders. SR1, SR2, and SR4
show the separation between ownership and control for the largest, the two largest and four largest shareholders.
Wedge10 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if control rights of the largest shareholder exceed cash flow rights
by at least 10%, and is zero otherwise. BGA is a dummy variable, with value equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a
business group, zero otherwise. FOwners is a dummy, with value one if there is a foreign stockholder among the five
largest shareholders, zero otherwise. Trading is a percentage that shows trading intensity of the stocks in a year.  Tests of
mean differences are also shown. Significant results (at 10% level or better) are shown in boldface.




n  256 91 
CR1    
Mean 0.281 0.400 
(P_value)  (0.00)   
Median 0.2051  0.412 
CR2    
Mean 0.426 0.566 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median 0.39  0.551 
CR4    
Mean 0.547 0.729 
(P-value)  (0.00)  
Median 0.57565  0.780 
CR10    
Mean 0.654 0.899 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median 0.6858  0.963 
Voting 1    
Mean 0.320 0.408 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median 0.2693  0.412 
Voting 2    
Mean 0.514 0.572 
(P_value)  (0.086)  
Median 0.47515  0.561 
Voting 3    
Mean 0.626 0.666 
(P_value) (0.283)   
Median 0.6265  0.674 
Voting 4    
Mean 0.702 0.735 
(P_value) (0.402)   
Median 0.7132  0.780 
SR1    
Mean 0.890 1.000 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median 0.9968  1.000 38 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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TABLE 3
LIST OF SURVEYED FIRMS
This table presents the list of firms that were surveyed. Firms that responded the questionnaire are in boldface.
Questionnaires for some firms that did not respond the questionnaire were filled by researchers based on public
information. These firms are in boldface and italics.
Cont. table 2




SR2    
Mean 0.867 1.000 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median  0.94629 1.000 
SR4    
Mean 0.828 1.000 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median  0.8525 1.000 
Wedge    
Mean 0.319 0.000 
(P_value)  (0.00)  
Median -  - 
  Firm 
1  Almacenes Éxito S.A. 
2  Cartón de Colombia S.A. 
3  Carulla Vivero S.A. 
4  Cementos del Caribe S.A. 
5  Cementos del Valle S.A. 
6  Cementos Paz del Río S.A. 
7  Cementos Rioclaro S.A. 
8  Compañía Colombiana de Inversiones Agrícolas S.A. 
9  Compañía Colombia de Tabaco S.A. 
10  Compañía Colombiana de Tejidos S.A. 
11  Compañía de Cemento Argos S.A. 
12  Inversiones Nacional de Chocolates S.A. 
13  Cine Colombia S.A. 
14  Colombina S.A. 
15  Compañía de Empaques S.A. 
16  Comunicación Celular S.A. 
17  Concreto S.A. 
18  Confecciones Colombia S.A. 
19  Electroporcelana Gamma S.A. 
20  Enka de Colombia S.A. 
21  Gas Natural S.A. E.S.P. 
22  Industrias Estra S.A. 
23  Industrias Metalúrgicas Unidas S.A. 
24  Inversiones Mundial S.A. 
25  Inversiones Reacol S.A. 
26  Mineros de Antioquia S.A. 
27  Organización de Ingeniería Internacional S.A. 
28  Papeles Nacionales S.A. 
29  Petroquímica Colombiana S.A. 
30  Polipropileno del Caribe S.A. LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 39
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Cont. table 3
  Firm 
31  Portafolio de Inversiones Suramericana S.A. 
32  Productos Familia S.A. 
33  Promigas S.A. E.S.P. 
34  Sociedad de Fabricación de Automotores S.A. 
35  Sociedades boblívar S.A. 
36  Suministros de Colombia S.A. 
37  Suramericana de Inversiones S.A. Suramericana 
38  Textiles Espinal S.A. 
39  Textiles Fabricato Tejicondor S.A. 
40  Aerovías de Integración Regional S.A. 
41  Bavaria S.A. 
42  Caracol Televisión S.A. 
43  Carbones del Caribe S.A. 
44  Compañía Colombiana de Clinker S.A. 
45  Manuelita S.A. 
46  Siderúrgica de Boyacá S.A. 
47  Pavco S.A. 
48  Mayagüez S.A. 40 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
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TABLE 4
CORPORATE GOBERNANCE INDEX: RAW AND TRANSFORMED RESULTS
This table present information on the estimates of the Colombian corporate governance index for a sample of 45
firms and a total of 31 questions of a survey conducted un 2004. CGI stands for the total corporate governance index;
Discipline is the index of the sub-component discipline; Accountability is the index of the sub-component,
accountability; Responsibility is the index of the subcomponent, responsibility; Independence is the index of the
sub-component, independence; Transparency is the index of the sub-component, transparency; and Fairness is the
index of the subcomponrnt, fairness.
Source: Authors' calculates from the Colombian Corporate Governance Survey.
Statistic  Discipline Accountability Responsibility Independence Transparency Fairness  CGI 
Minimum 
Value Obtained 
0.00 8.33  0.00  0.00  2.56 0.00  34.47 
Maximum 
Value Obtained 
16.67 16.67  16.67  12.50  12.82 16.67  69.21 
Median 8.33  8.33 11.11 4.17  8.97  10.00  47.59 
Average 7.13  10.19  8.64  6.11  8.83  8.96  49.86 
Standard 




PANEL A. MAIN VARIABLES
Standard 
Variable Obs  Mean  Standard 
Deviation  Min Max  Median 
Tobin’s q  344  0.819  0.38  0.09  2.39  0.756 
MTBR 343  0.748  0.64  -0.07  3.98  0.626 
MTS 336  2.171  3.29  0.00  17.84  0.848 
ROA 342  0.024  0.07  -0.21  0.19  0.024 
ROE 349  0.009  0.16  -0.91  0.57  0.030 
            
CR4 347  0.59  0.24  0.05  1.00  0.60 
VRCR4 353  0.71  0.33  0.06  2.14  0.72 
SR4 353  0.87  0.16  0.34  1.00  0.95 
Dif1 354  0.13  0.21  -0.98  1.15  0.02 
Dif2 354  0.62  0.48  0.00  1.00  1 
Dif3 354  0.31  0.46  0.00  1.00  0.00 
Wedge 353  0.23  0.42  0.00  1.00  0 
            
Lnrsales 354  10.97  1.86  5.33  15.29  11.26 
Grsales 338  0.46  6.76  -0.63  124.23  0.02 
K7S 354  1.12  1.71  0.00  16.64  0.51 
Debt-Ratio 354  0.34  0.24  0.00  1.96  0.29 
            
Trading 354  0.17  0.28  0.00  0.99  0.03 
Bursatil 354  3.93  2.79  0.00  10.00  3.33 
Lyears 354  21.30  20.66  1.00  74.00  13.50 
BGA 354  0.73  0.45  0.00  1.00  1 
Rdmmy 354  0.50  0.50  0.00  1.00  1 
FO 354  0.26  0.44  0  1.00  0 
PANEL B. YEAR TO YEAR EVOLUTION OF SOME VARIABLES
Year Firms  tobin’s  grsales  trading  cr4 Dif1 
1998  97  0.945 -0.017  0.133 0.593  0.136 
1999 81  0.838  1.597  0.170  0.593  0.119 
2000 69  0.777  0.150  0.156  0.577  0.116 
2001 57  0.716  0.242  0.196  0.598  0.141 

































































































PANEL C. CORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED VARIABLES
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  (18)  (19)  (20)  (21)  (22) 
1   T o b i n ’ s   q   1                       
2   M T B R   0 . 8 6   1                      
3  MTS  0.12  0.15  1                    
4  ROA  0.03  0.11  -0.08  1                   
5  ROE  0.01  0.02  -0.11  0.86  1                  
6  CR4  0.14  0.03  -0.13  0.02  -0.01  1                 
7  VRCR4  0.17  0.05  -0.07  0.09  0.02  0.84  1                
8  SR4  -0.10  -0.04  -0.08  -0.15  -0.05  0.01  -0.48  1               
9  Dif1  0.14  0.07  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.19  0.66  -0.75  1              
10  Dif2  0.15  0.08  0.12  0.03  -0.03  -0.12  0.20  -0.62  0.50  1             
11  Dif3  0.12 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.53  -0.78 0.77 0.52  1                       
12  Wedge  0.13  0.13  0.04  0.03  -0.04  -0.05  0.23  -0.63  0.41  0.43  0.49  1           
13  Lnrsales  0.04 0.00  -0.41 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.21  -0.26 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.11  1                   
14 Grsales  0.01  0.01  0.08 -0.02  0.00 -0.05 -0.05  0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.13  1                 
15 K/S  -0.16 -0.13  0.21 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11 -0.11  0.05 -0.07  0.01 -0.09 -0.01 -0.37  0.18  1               
16 Debit-Ratio  0.41  0.09 -0.31 -0.29 -0.23  0.19  0.13  0.06 -0.03 -0.06  0.02 -0.08  0.21 -0.08 -0.19  1             
17 Trading  -0.08 -0.06  0.07  0.20  0.07 -0.19 -0.06 -0.34  0.09  0.26  0.26  0.18  0.40 -0.03 -0.12 -0.19  1           
18  bursatil  -0.10  -0.10 0.04 0.22 0.08  -0.11 0.04  -0.36 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.18 0.46  -0.06  -0.14  -0.19 0.86  1         
19 Lyears  -0.25 -0.30 -0.15  0.01  0.05 -0.12 -0.02 -0.20  0.12  0.11  0.19 -0.01  0.26 -0.05 -0.01  0.05  0.37  0.37  1       
20  BGA  0.07 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.00  -0.34  -0.04  -0.49 0.26 0.66 0.29 0.34 0.21  -0.09 0.08  -0.12 0.27 0.26 0.06  1     
21 Rdummy  0.20  0.16 -0.02 -0.23 -0.11 -0.01 -0.03  0.11  0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.02 -0.22  0.04  0.02  0.12 -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.12  1   
22 FO  -0.07 -0.11  0.01 -0.07 -0.15  0.17  0.02  0.23 -0.15 -0.10 -0.18 -0.19  0.28 -0.04 -0.01  0.01  0.10  0.14 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04  1 
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TABLE 6
POOLED-OLS REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND COLOMBIAN CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The regressions are performed using pooled OLS for the period 1998-2002. The dependent variable is Tobin’s q; CR4
is the percentage of direct ownership owned by the four largest shareholders; SqCR4 is the square of CR4; Voting
Rights(CR4) is the percentage of control rights that the four largest shareholders own; Sq( Voting Rights) is the square
of voting rights; Dif1 is a continuous variable measuring the difference between the share of control rights and the
share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the four largest owners; Wedge10 is a dummy equal to one if control rights
exceed cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; LnSales is the natural log of operating income in Colombian pesos of
1998; GrSales is the three year moving average of real annual percentage growth in operating income;  Debt-Ratio is the
ratio of total liabilities to total assets; K/S is the ratio of fixed capital to operating income; BGA is a dummy equal to
one if the firm is affiliated to a business group, and is zero otherwise; FOwner is a dummy equal to one if there is a
foreign stockholder among the first five largest stockholders of the firm in a given year, and zero otherwise; LYears is
the number of years the stocks of the firm have been listed in the Colombian Stock Exchanges; Rdummy is a dummy
equal to one for the years 1998 and 1999 and is zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-student.
Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) are in boldface. 0
  Tobin’s q 
Dependent  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(CR4)   0.7283 0.6788     0.7001  0.6579 0.7622  0.7077 
   (2.13) (1.96)     (2.05)  (1.90) (2.19)  (2.00) 
Sq(CR4)   -0.6290 -0.5847     -0.6514 -0.6094  -0.6563 -0.6081 
   (-2.10) (-1.94)     (-2.17) (-2.01)  (-2.12) (-1.94) 
Voting  rights      0.1469  0.1392       
      (1.97)  (1.86)       
Sq (Voting Rights 
CR4)      -0.2593  -0.2478       
      (-2.07)  (-1.96)       
Dif1         0.1861  0.1689    
         (1.86)  (1.65)    
Wedge  10            -0.0182  -0.0152 
            (-0.38)  (-0.31) 
LnSales  -0.0149 -0.0234 -0.1542  -0.0171 -0.1527 -0.0267  -0.1447 -0.0230  -0.1527 
  (-0.90) (-1.39) (-2.03)  (-1.00) (-2.01) (-1.55)  (-1.90) (-1.36)  (-2.00) 
SqLnSales     0.0062    0.0065   0.0056   0.0062 
     (1.76)    (1.79)   (1.57)   (1.73) 
GrSales  0.0029 0.0031 0.0027  0.0028 0.0024 0.0030  0.0026 0.0031  0.0027 
  (1.50) (1.55) (1.34)  (1.48) (1.25) (1.51)  (1.32) (1.55)  (1.34) 
DebtRatio  0.7591 0.7939 0.7997  0.7379 0.7450 0.7895  0.7952 0.7957  0.8012 
  (7.86) (8.51) (8.62)  (7.52) (7.59) (8.45)  (8.56) (8.61)  (8.71) 
K/S  -0.0344 -0.0350 -0.0378  -0.0338 -0.0367 -0.0349  -0.0375 -0.0351  -0.0378 
  (-2.89) (-2.85) (-3.16)  (-2.84) (-3.22) (-2.85)  (-3.13) (-2.86)  (-3.17) 
BGA  0.1804 0.2105 0.2178  0.1758 0.1835 0.1809  0.1903 0.2145  0.2211 
  (3.13) (3.65) (3.75)  (3.08) (3.21) (2.95)  (3.07) (3.73)  (3.81) 
Fowner  -0.0869 -0.0841 -0.0895  -0.0870 -0.0937 -0.0703  -0.0765 -0.0880  -0.0928 
  (-1.65) (-1.52) (-1.62)  (-1.64) (-1.75) (-1.26)  (-1.37) (-1.55)  (-1.63) 
Lyears -0.0038  -0.0036  -0.0038  -0.0033  -0.0036 -0.0035  -0.0037 -0.0036  -0.0038 
  (-4.75) (-3.84) (-4.04)  (-3.77) (-3.96) (-3.74)  (-3.93) (-3.77)  (-3.96) 
Rdummy  0.0500 0.0378 0.0473  -0.0441 0.0542 0.0361  0.0448 0.0385  0.0478 
  (155) (1.21) (1.53)  (1.38) (1.70) (1.16)  (1.44) (1.23)  (1.54) 
Industry Dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
              
Constant  0.8179 0.7517 1.4380  0.7438 1.4512 0.8284  1.4419 0.7385  1.4204 
  (3.63) (3.23) (3.09)  (3.22) (3.15) (3.46)  (3.13) (3.22)  (3.05) 
Regression Statistics 
R2  0.4578 0.4931 0.4972  0.4671 0.4714 0.4973  0.5006 0.4934  0.4974 
Num  of  firms              
Num  Obs  328 321 321  328 328 321  321 321  321 
F-test  17.05 22.53 22.40  16.75 15.82 21.68  20.81 21.55  21.66 
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TABLE 7
POOLED-OLS REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FIRM’S
VALUATION AND COLOMBIAN CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The regressions are performed using pooled OLS for the period 1998-2002. The dependent variables are Market-to-
Book Ratio (MTBR) and Market to Sales (MTS); CR4 is the percentage of direct ownership owned by the four largest
shareholders; SqCR4 is the square of CR4; Dif1 is a continuous variable measuring the difference between the share of
control rights and the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the four largest owners; ; LnSales is the natural log of
operating income in Colombian pesos of 1998; GrSales is the three year moving average of real annual percentage
growth in operating income;  Debt-Ratio is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; K/S is the ratio of fixed capital
to operating income; BGA is a dummy equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a business group, and is zero otherwise;
FOwner is a dummy equal to one if there is a foreign stockholder among the first five largest stockholders of the firm
in a given year, and zero otherwise; LYears is the number of years the stocks of the firm have been listed in the
Colombian Stock Exchanges; Rdummy is a dummy equal to one for the years 1998 and 1999 and is zero otherwise.
Numbers in parentheses are robust t-student. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed
test) are in boldface.
MTBR MTS  Dependent Variable 
(1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 
(CR4) -0.29558  0.86628  0.84133  0.89006  -2.51248  -2.56520 
 (-1.53)  (1.38)  (1.35)  (0.92)  (-0.71)  (-0.73) 
Sq(CR4)   -1.01369  -1.03757    2.95144  2.88899 
   (-1.88) (-1.90)   (0.93)  (0.89) 
Dif1     0.18110      0.43678 
     (0.94      (0.41) 
LnSales  -0.17594 0.00131 -0.00204  -0.70220 -0.69907  -0.70533 
 (-1.09)  (0.04)  (-0.06)  (-3.67) (-3.69)  (-3.73) 
GrSales 0.00316  0.00386  0.00372  -0.35674  -0.40273  -0.39265 
 (1.12)  (1.38)  (1.33)  (-0.69)  (-0.76)  (-0.75) 
DebtRatio 0.37339  0.36338  0.35954  -1.18584  -1.17246  -1.18369 
 (1.46)  (1.44)  (1.43)  (-1.82) (-1.80)  (-1.81) 
K/S -0.07203  -0.06905  -0.06913  -0.24453  -0.24223  -0.24307 
  (-3.14) (-2.69)  (-2.69)  (-1.27) (-1.28)  (-1.29) 
BGA 0.10866  0.10191  0.07376  1.42541  1.42252  1.35161 
 (1.01)  (0.98)  (0.67)  (2.72) (2.75)  (2.23) 
Fowner -0.23079  -0.24857  -0.23552  1.31511  1.37779  1.41071 
  (-2.27) (-2.41)  (-2.24) (2.69)  (2.67) (2.84) 
Lyears -0.00882  -0.00847  -0.00839  0.00235  0.00226  0.00241 
  (-5.53) (-4.89)  (-4.89) (0.23) (0.22)  (0.24) 
Rdummy 0.12631  0.11191  0.11040  -0.32459  -0.32947  -0.33069 
  (1.90) (0.67)  (1.63)  (-1.18) (-1.20)  (-1.19) 
Industry Dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
            
Constant 1.91259  0.77086  0.84588  9.54246  10.19814  10.35932 
  (2.141) (1.86)  (1.98)  (4.812) (4.67)  (4.68) 
Regression Statistics 
R2 0.3361  0.3404  0.3417  0.4826  0.4850  0.4853 
Num of firms             
Num Obs  321  321  321  319  319  319 
F-test 9.10  9.70  9.61  9.09  8.80  9.03 
Prob>F 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 45
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TABLE 8
POOLED-OLS REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FIRM PERFORMANCE AND COLOMBIAN CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The regressions are performed using pooled-OLS. The dependent variables are ROA and ROE; CR4 is the percentage
of direct ownership owned by the four largest shareholders; SqCR4 is the square of CR4; Wedge10 is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if control rights of the largest shareholder exceed cash flow rights by at least 10%  and is zero
otherwise; LnSales is the natural log of operating income in Colombian pesos of 1998; GrSales is the three year
moving average of real annual percentage growth in operating income; debtRatio is total debt to total assets ratio; K/
S is the ratio of fixed capital to operating income; BGA is a dummy variable, equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a
Colombian business group, and is zero otherwise; FOwner is a dummy variable, equal to one if there is a foreign
stockholder among the first five largest stockholders of the firm in a given year, and zero otherwise; LYears is the
number of years the stocks of the firm have been listed in the Colombian Stock Exchanges; Rdummy is a dummy
variable, equal to one for the years 1998 and 1999 and is zero otherwise. Numbers in parentheses are robust t-student.
Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) are in boldface.
ROA ROE  Dependent Variable 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
(CR4)    0.058  0.095     -0.029  0.074  
    0.89  (1.45)     (-0.20)  (0.51)  
Sq(CR4)    -0.054  -0.084     0.013  -0.072  
    (-0.93)  (-1.45)     (0.10)  (-0.59)  
Voting  rights      0.027      0.029 
      (1.69)      (0.77) 
Voting Rights Squared        -0.076        -0.098 
       (2.38)       (-1.53) 
Wedge  10      -0.021 -0.031     -0.061 -0.075 
     (-2.09) (-2.81)     (-2.56)  (-2.60) 
LnSales  0.010 0.010 0.010  0.011 0.013 0.014  0.015  0.015 
  (3.11) (2.88) (3.07)  (3.32) (1.90) (1.97)  (2.21)  (2.19) 
GrSales  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001  0.001 
  (1.30) (1.31) (1.37)  (1.23) (0.91) (0.88)  (0.99)  (0.90) 
DebtRatio  -0.125 -0.122 -0.121  -0.129 -0.270 -0.261  -0.258  -0.272 
  (-5.87) (-5.60) (-5.83)  (-6.04) (-4.05) (-3.80)  (-3.92)  (-4.15) 
K/S  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007  -0.007 -0.013 -0.012  -0.012  -0.013 
  (-2.48) (-2.38)  (-2.5) (-2.60)  (-2.01) (-1.88) (-2.0)  (-24.13) 
BGA  0.016 0.020 0.025  0.020 0.003  -0.001  0.012  0.014 
  (1.63)  (1.82) (2.22)  (1.96) (0.14) (-0.03)  (0.45)  (0.56) 
Fowner  -0.025 -0.028 -0.032  -0.032 -0.062 -0.067  -0.079  -0.076 
  (-2.65) (-2.68) (-2.98)  (-3.30) (-2.78) (-2.89)  (-3.49)  (-3.44) 
Lyears  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (-1.00) (-0.99) (-1.25)  (-1.01)  (1.07)  (0.88) (0.52) (.071) 
Rdummy  -0.022 -0.024 -0.023  -0.023 -0.029 -0.030  -0.029  -0.030 
  (-3.41) (-3.62)  (-3.6) (-3.60)  (-1.89) (-1.95)  (-1.88) (-1.97) 
Industry  Dummy  yes yes yes  yes yes yes    yes 
             
Constant  -0.055 -0.062 -0.075  -0.100 -0.044 -0.042  -0.080  -0.079 
 (-1.52)  (-1.510)  (-1.84)  (-1.31) (-0.64) (-0.49)  (-0.92)  (-1.055) 
Regression Statistics 
R2  0.4443 0.4469 0.4573  0.4657 0.3063 0.2940  0.3106  0.3269 
Num of firms  
Num Obs  326 319 319  325 333 326  326  332 
F-test  12.74 11.91 11.12  12.04  6.97  6.84 7.34 6.74 
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TABLE 9
FGLS AND FIXED EFFECT PANEL DATA REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETURN ON ASSET AND COLOMBIAN
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The regressions are performed using FGLS and fixed effect panel data. The dependent variable is ROA; CR4 is the
percentage of direct ownership owned by the four largest shareholders; SqCR4 is the square of CR4; Dif1 is a continuous
variable measuring the difference between the share of control rights and the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the
four largest owners; Dif2 is a dummy equal to one if control rights exceed cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; Dif3 is a
dummy equal to one if control is greater than ownership, and if this difference is greater than the median separation in
firms where control and ownership differ (for the top four owners) and is zero otherwise; LnSales is the natural log of
operating income in Colombian pesos of 1998; GrSales is the three year moving average of real annual percentage growth
in operating income; DebtRatio is total debt to total assets ratio; K/S is the ratio of fixed capital to operating income;
BGA is a dummy equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a Colombian business group, and is zero otherwise; FOwner is
a dummy equal to one if there is a foreign stockholder among the first five largest stockholders of the firm in a given year,
and zero otherwise; LYears is the number of years the stocks of the firm have been listed in the Colombian Stock
Exchanges; Rdummy is a dummy equal to one for the years 1998 and 1999 and is zero otehrwise; Stocks Traded is a
dummy equal to one for the year the firm’s stocks were traded. Number in parentheses are robust t-student. Coefficients
significant at least at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) are in boldface.
ROA FGLS  Fixed  Effects 
Dependent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
(CR4) 0.1379  0.1515  0.1516  0.1290  0.6161  0.6043  0.6551  0.6300 
  (3.18) (3.43)  (3.26)  (2.75)  (2.57  (2.52)  (2.72)  (2.61) 
Sq(CR4) -0.1320  -0.1441  -0.1360  -0-1175  -0.4717  -0.4565  -0.4945  -0.4812 
  (-3.56) (-3.82)  (-3.48)  (-2.89)  (-2.36)  (-2.27)  (-2.47)  (-2.40) 
Dif1   -0.0026             
   (-0.28)             
Dif2     -0.0190        -0.0344   
     (-1.98)       (-0.26)  
Dif3       -0.0104        -0.0131 
       (-1.61)       (0.54) 
LnSales 0.0129  0.0127  0.0119  0.0131  0.0028  -0.0026  -0.0021  -0.0029 
  (7.97) (7.57)  (7.25)  (7.74)  (-0.34) (-0.33)  (-0.26)  (-0.35) 
GrSales 0.0002  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0012  0.0012  0.0012  0.0011 
 (0.44)  (0.52)  (0.46)  (0.54)  (2.2) (2.21)  (2.20)  (2.20) 
DebtRatio -0.1670  -0.1640  -0.1682  -0.1700  -0.0834  -0.0834  -0.0842  -0.0834 
  (-14.00) (-13.32)  (-13.86)  (-14.47)  (-6.42) (-6.42)  (-6.48)  (-6.42) 
K/S -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  (-3.10) (-2.95)  (-2.90)  (-2.47)  (-0.29) (-0.28)  (-0.24)  (-0.29) 
Fowner -0.0555  -0.0579  -0.0551  -0.0544  -0.0664  -0.0651  -0.0662  -0.0671 
  (-10.03) (-10.78) (-9.53) (-8.48) -0.84) (-0.82)  (-0.84)  (-0.85) 
BGA 0.0126  0.0125  0.0300  0.0159         
  (2.37) (2.09)  (2.94)  (2.60)        
Lyears -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0002  -0.0027  -0.0027  -0.0026  -0.0028 
 (-1.58)  (-1.77) (-1.80)  (-1.75) (1.03) (1.02)  (0.97)  (1.04) 
Rdummy -0.0335  -0.0347  -0.0329  -0.0329  -0.0265  -0.0259  -0.0264  -0.0271 
  (-10.13) (-10.26) (-9.62) (-9.40)  (-2.27) (-2.21)  (-2.27)  (-2.31) 
Stocks Traded  0.0066  0.0083  0.0067  0.0070  0.0295  0.0318  0.0307  0.0295 
  (1.6)  (1.85)  (1.57) (.154)  (2.07) (2.18)  (2.15)  (2.07) 
Industry Dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  No  No  No  No 
                
Constant -0.0490  -0.0977  -0.0606  -0.0521  -0.1573  -0.1584  -0.1562  -0.1572 
 (-2.45)  (-4.31)  (-2.64)  (-2.33)  (-1.27)  (-1.28) (-1.26) (-1.27) 
Regression Statistics 
R2         0.1612  0.1589  0.1550  0.1598 
Num of firms  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101 
Num Obs  455  455  455  455  455  455  455  455 
F-test         6.6  6.04  5.15  6.01 
Prob>F         0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Wald chi2 ()  1252.8  1085.7  1164.8  1163.1         
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TABLE 10
FGLS AND FIXED EFFECT PANEL DATA REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RETURN ON EQUITY AND COLOMBIAN
 CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
The regressions are performed using FGLS and fixed effect panel data. The dependent variable is ROE; CR4 is the
percentage of direct ownership owned by the four largest shareholders; SqCR4 is the square of CR4; Dif1 is a continuous
variable measuring the difference between the share of control rights and the share of cash-flow rights in the hands of the
four largest owners; Dif2 is a dummy equal to one if control rights exceed cash-flow rights, and zero otherwise; Dif3 is a
dummy equal to one if control is greater than ownership, and if this difference is greater than the median separation in
firms where control and ownership differ (for the top four owners) and is zero otherwise; LnSales is the natural log of
operating income in Colombian pesos of 1998; GrSales is the three year moving average of past real annual percentage
growth in operating income; DebtRatio is total debt to total assets ratio; K/S is the ratio of fixed capital to operating
income; BGA is a dummy equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a Colombian business group, and is zero otherwise;
FOwner is a dummy equal to one if there is a foreign stockholder among the first five largest stockholders of the firm in
a given year, and zero otherwise; LYears is the number of years the stocks of the firm have been listed in the Colombian
Stock Exchanges; Rdummy is a dummy equal to one for the years 1998 and 1999 and is zero otehrwise; Stocks Traded is
a dummy equal to one for the year the firm’s stocks were traded. Number in parentheses are robust t-student. Coefficients
significant at least at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) are in boldface.
ROE FGLS  Fixed  Effects 
Dependent  Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
(CR4)  0.1379 0.2062 0.1913  0.3745 0.6480 0.6337  0.7226  0.6610 
  (3.18) (3.76) (3.28) (5,89)  (1,09) (1,07)  (1,21)  (1,10) 
Sq(CR4) -0.1320  -0.2055  -0.1712  -0.2937  -0.5116 -0.4822  -0.5555  -0.5217 
 (-3.56)  (-4,41)  (-3.68)  (-5,75)  (-1,01) (-0.95)  (-1,09)  (-1,02) 
Dif1    0.0129      -0.1342     
    (0,73)      (-1,23)     
Dif2     -0.0706       -0.0613  
     (-6,93)      (-0.95)   
Dif3      -0.0661      -0.0092 
       (-11,34)       (-0,16) 
LnSales  0.0116 0.0114 0.0103  0.0142 0.0165 0.0171  0.0180  0.0165 
  (4,18) (3,98) (3,57) (5,29)  (0,88) (0.91)  (0.95)  (0.88) 
GrSales  0.0021 0.0021  0.0032 0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0028  -0.0028  -0.0028 
 (0,68)  (0.70)  (1,07)  (1,03)  (-2,20) (-2,19)  (-2,21)  (-2,20) 
DebtRatio  0.0200 0.0212 0.0183  0.0167 0.0536 0.0515  0.0505  0.0533 
 (1,52)  (1,60)  (1,36)  (1,20)  (4,09) (3,89)  (3,74)  (4,02) 
K/S  -0.0002  -0.0015 0.0000  -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003  0.0004  0.0003 
  (-1,22) (-1,08) (-0,04)  (-0,45)  (0.44)  (0.47) (0.50) (0.45) 
Fowner -0.0560  -0.0547  -0.0570  -0.0674 -0.2357 -0.2312  -0.2350  -0.2364 
  (-7,47) (-7,08) (-7,38) (-7,89)  (-1,26) (-1,24)  (-1,26)  (-1,26) 
BGA 0.0600  0.0562  0.1214  0.0991         
  (5,88) (5,07) (8,98) (8,16)        
Lyears  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003  -0.0002  0.0156  0.0156 0.0152 0.0156 
 (-0,76)  (-0,54)  (-1.53)  (-0,74)  (2,30) (2,31)  (2,24)  (2,30) 
Rdummy -0.0403  -0.0392  -0.0428  -0.0452 -0.0151 -0.0122  -0.0149  -0.0155 
  (-8,14) (-7,71) (-8,56)  (-7,97)  (-0,54) (-0,43)  (-0,53)  (-0,55) 
Stocks  Traded  0.0291 0.0255 0.0383  0.0377 0.1207 0.1291  0.1226  0.1205 
  (3,28) (2,72) (4,08)  (3,69) (3,57) (3,74)  (3,62)  (3,56) 
Industry Dummy  yes  yes  yes  yes  No  No  No  No 
             
Constant -0.1368  -0.2279  -0.1351  -0.2381 -0.7001 -0.7126  -0.7021  -0.7023 
  (-3,87) (-5,41) (-3,59)  (-6,81) (-2,36) (-2,40)  (-2,37)  (-2,36) 
Regression Statistics 
R2         0.0063  0.0047  0.0060  0.0062 
Num of firms  101  101  101  101  101  101  101  101 
Num  Obs  450 450 455  455 450 455  455  455 
F-test         4,57  4,30  4,20  4,15 
Prob>F         0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000 
Wald chi2 ()  644.59  607.26  725.45  741.2         
Prob>chi2 0.00000  0.00000  0.00000  0.00000         48 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
TABLE 11
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 43 FIRMS 2003-04
PANEL A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX AND SUBCOMPONENTS
Variable Firms  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min Max  Median 
CGI 43  49.44  9.61  34.47  69.21  47.41 
Discipline 43  6.88  4.63  0.00  16.67  4.17 
Accountability 43  10.08 3.43  8.33  16.67  8.33 
Responsibility 43  8.66 4.25  0.00  16.67  11.11 
Independence 43  6.30 3.07  0.00  12.50  4.17 
Transparency 43  8.77  2.42  2.56  12.82  8.97 
Fairness 43  8.76  3.99  0.00  16.67  6.67 
PANEL B. MAIN CONTROL VARIABLES
Variable Firms  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min Max  Median 
CGI 43  49.44  9.61  34.47  69.21  47.41 
ROA 43  0.07  0.06  -0.04  0.26  0.06 
ROE 43  0.11  0.08  -0.07  0.32  0.09 
CR4T-1 43  0.61  0.24  0.08  1.00  0.60 
Wedge 43  0.21  0.41  0.00  1.00  0.00 
LNSales 43  25.59  1.14  23.20  28.40  25.58 
Gsalest-3 43  0.18  0.21  -0.16  0.97  0.12 
Debt-Ratio 43  0.32  0.20 0.00  0.80  0.30 
K/S 43  0.82  0.92  0.00  5.07  0.66 
Trading 43  0.28  0.39  0.00  1.00  0.02 
Bursatil 43  3.26  3.55  0.00  9.58  2.28 
Type 43  0.58  0.50  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Lyears 43  24.71  21.27  1.50  75.50  18.50 
BGA 43  0.79  0.41  0.00  1.00  1.00 
Members 43  9.49  2.69  6.00  14.00  10.00 



















































5 PANEL C. CORRELATION MATRIX OF SELECTED VARIABLES
Variable  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16) 
1  CGI  1.00                 
2  ROA  -0.19  1.00               
3 ROE  -0.20  0.88  1 . 0 0               
4 ROECR4T-1  0.17  -0.24  -0.24  1.00             
5  Wedge  -0.07  0.20  0.12  -0.18  1.00            
6 LNSales  0.17  -0.34 -0.27 -0.02  -0.01  1.00           
7 Gsales t-3 0.24  0.26 0.28  -0.06  0.22  -0.06  1.00          
8 Debt-Ratio  -0.02  -0.48  -0.08 0.19  -0.30  0.31  -0.11  1.00         
9 K/S  0.15  -0.01 -0.11  0.29  0.21 -0.03 -0.28  -0.16  1.00        
10 Trading  0.28  -0.09 -0.19 -0.28  0.17  0.36  0.11  -0.19  0.13  1.00       
11 Bursatil  0.29  0.03 -0.11 -0.23  0.24  0.34  0.09  -0.27  0.17  0.94  1.00      
12  Type  0.18  0.20  -0.02  -0.21 0.20 0.16 0.02  -0.43  0.14  0.61 0.79 1.00     
13  Lyears  0.03 -0.17  -0.22  -0.33  -0.01 0.16 0.03 0.00  -0.16 0.73 0.68 0.47 1.00    
14 BGA  -0.02  0.09  0.07  0.04  0.26  0.20 -0.13 -0.12  0.17  0.27 0.30 0.26 0.13 1.00     
15 Members  -0.06  0.04  0.12 -0.41  -0.12  0.30  0.08 0.18  -0.29  0.16 0.15 0.05 0.10  -0.23 1.00   
16 CGC  0.45  -0.15 -0.15  0.08  0.07  0.37  0.08 -0.02  0.03  0.47 0.42 0.17 0.06 0.16 0.19 1.00 
Cont. table 1150 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
TABLE 12
OLS REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE
AND MAIN DETERMINANTS
The regressions are performed using OLS. The dependent variable is CGI, the corporate governance index; Wedge10
is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if control rights of the largest shareholder exceed cash flow rights by at
least 10%  and is zero otherwise; LnSales is the natural log of operating income in Colombian pesos of 1998; GrSales
is the three year moving average of past real annual percentage growth in operating income; K/S is the ratio of fixed
capital to operating income; BGA is a dummy variable, equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a Colombian business
group, and is zero otherwise; CGC is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the firm has issued a code of
corporate governance practices, zero otherwise; DebtRatio is total debt to total assets ratio TSecurity is a dummy
variable equal to one if the firm is listed as issuer of stocks and zero otherwise; Members is the number of total
members of firm’s board of directors; Bursatil is a variable between 0 and 10 that measure the level of trading of a
given stock. Number in parentheses are robust t-student. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on a
two-tailed test) are in boldface.
Dependent 
Variable: CGI  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
LnSales 1.736  1.623  2.027  0.716  0.965 
 (1.27)  (0.94)  (1.21)  (0.45)  (0.51) 
GrSales 11.310  13.976  13.972  11.908  10.153 
  (2.49) (2.33)  (2.34)  (2.48)  (1.69) 
Lyears   -0.020  -0.021  -0.015  -0.158 
   (-0.30)  (-0.31)  (-0.23)  (-1.59) 
BGA   -1.938  -2.875  -4.070  -4.284 
   (-0.50)  (-0.76)  (-1.26)  (-1.22) 
Tsecurity   3.211  3.595  3.457  -1.774 
   (0.97)  (1.08)  (1.16)  (-0.42) 
CGC       8.164   
       (2.64)   
DebtRatio   2.391  2.843  5.352  6.374 
   (0.23)  (0.28)  (0.64)  (0.65) 
K/S   2.473  2.075  1.778  0.445 
   (1.59)  (1.20)  (1.14)  (0.22) 
Members     -0.552  -0.747  -0.838 
     (-0.99)  (-1.15)  (-1.23) 
bursatil         1.778 
         (1.86) 
Constant 26.926  25.145  26.352  40.381  44.309 
 (1.63)  (1.36)  (1.46)  (2.46) (1.98) 
Regression Statistics 
R2  0.103 0.180  0.198 0.346 0.263 
        
Num  Obs  43.000 43.000  43.000 43.000 43.000 
F-test  3.990 1.660  1.700 6.300 3.180 
Prob>F  0.026 0.151  0.133 0.000 0.007 LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 51
Julio de 2005
TABLE 13
OLS AND 2SLS REGRESSION RESULTS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
INDEX AND CONTROL VARIABLES
The regressions are performed using OLS and 2SLS. The dependent variable is ROA; CGI is the corporate governance
index; Wedge10 is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if control rights of the largest shareholder exceed cash flow
rights by at least 10% and is zero otherwise; LnSales is the natural log of operating income in Colombian pesos of 1998;
GrSales is the three year moving average of past real annual percentage growth in operating income; CR4t-1 is the
percentage of direct ownership owned by the four largest shareholders in 2002-03; SqCR4 is the square of CR4 respec-
tively; K/S is the ratio of fixed capital to operating income; BGA is a dummy equal to one if the firm is affiliated to a
Colombian business group, and is zero otherwise; CGC is a dummy that takes a value of one if the firm has issued a code
of corporate governance practices, zero otherwise; TSecurity is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed as issuer
of stocks and zero otherwise; Members is the number of members of board of directors. Numbers in parentheses are
robust t-student. Coefficients significant at least at the 10% level (based on a two-tailed test) are in boldface.
2SLS 
Dependent Variable  ROA    ROA 
  (1)  (2) (1) (2) (3) (1) 
CGI 0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.000   
 (-0.54)  (-0.88)  (-0.65)  (-0.44)  (-0.2)   
Independence          0.006 
          ( 3 . 1 8 )  
LnSales  -0.010  -0.016  -0.009 -0.010 -0.016 -0.013 
  (-1.72) (-2.69) (-1.40) (-1.51)  (-2.68) (-2.37) 
GrSales  0.082  0.100  0.093 0.099 0.095 0.111 
  (3.48)  (4.12)  (2.81) (2.72) (2.73) (5.38) 
CR4t-1  0.007  -0.032  0.004 -0.004 -0.029 -0.012 
  (0.07)  (-0.29)  (0.03) (-0.04) (-0.26) (-0.12) 
(CR4 t-1)2  -0.037  -0.009  -0.031 -0.032 -0.011 -0.011 
  (-0.37)  (-0.09)  (-0.33) (-0.32) (-0.11) (-0.13) 
Lyears  -0.001  0.000 -0.001  -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  (-1.88)  (-1.27)  (-1.84) (-1.93) (-1.22) (-1.35) 
Wedge10    -0.017   -0.020 -0.016 -0.028 
    (-8.85)   (-0.97) (-0.77) (-1.65) 
BGA  0.010  0.026  0.009 0.014 0.026 0.035 
  (0.69)  (1.53)  (0.57) (0.89) (1.61) (2.52) 
Tsecurity  0.014  0.017  0.018 0.016 0.015 0.021 
  (0.77)  (0.87)  (0.90) (0.83) (0.77) (1.42) 
Debt-ratio  -0.048  -0.050  -0.049 -0.052 -0.048 -0.062 
 (-1.42)  (-1.31)  (-1.42)  (-1.67)  (-1.21)  (-1.81) 
K/S  0.003 0.0.008  0.005 0.007 0.007 0.004 
  (0.32)  (0.88)  (0.50) (0.65) (0.71) (0.46) 
uoff    -0.032     -0.033 -0.048 
   (-1.42)      (-1.48)  (-2.77) 
uofif    -0.013     -0.017 -0.088 
   (-0.44)      (-0.61)  (-2.76) 
uofo   0.004      0.000  -0.024 
   (0.15)      (0.01)  (-0.99) 
Constant  0.219  0.311  0.243 0.233 0.294 0.203 
  (4.78)  (5.71)  (3.40) (3.22) (3.73) (3.07) 
Regression Statistics 
R2  0.440 0.541  0.412 0.458 0.537 0.660 
         
Num  Obs  41 41  41 41 41 41 
F-test  8.370   6.140  7.330   
Prob>F  0.000    0.000 0.000 0.000   
 52 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
FIGURE 2
TOBIN’S Q AND SEPARATION RATIO OF CASH-FLOW RIGHT
 AND VOTING RIGHTS FOR THE ULTIMATE OWNER
Scatter plot of Tobin’s q versus the separation ratio of the ultimate owner. The fitted line is
estimated using 108 firms.
FIGURE 1
TOBIN’S Q AND CASH-FLOW RIGHTS OF FOUR LARGEST SHAREHOLDERS



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ ytobin Fitted valuesLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 53
Julio de 2005
FIGURE 3
TOBIN’S Q AND ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH IN SALES
Scatter plot of Tobin’s q versus the Annual Growth Rate of Sales. The fitted line is esti-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TOBIN’S Q AND RETURN ON ASSETS





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































￿ytobin Fitted values54 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71
FIGURE 5
COMPANY VALUATION AND OWNERSHIP OF THE LARGEST SHAREHOLDER
FIGURE 6























































































































































































































































































qLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 55
Julio de 2005
FIGURE 7
CGI AND RETURN ON ASSETS –ROA-
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Borradores de investigación - No. 71
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￿ cgi Fitted values
FIGURE 10
CGI AND FIRMS THAT ADOPTED A CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE -CGC
Scatter plot of CGI versus Code of Corporate Governance –CGC. The fitted line is esti-
mated using 43 firmsLUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 57
Julio de 2005






Does the company’s Annual Report include a section 
devoted to the company’s performance in 
implementing corporate govermance principles? 
Survey question 2. 
1 0  43  14  0.33 
A.2  Does the company have a code of conduct with 
corporate govermance principles? Survey question 3.  1 0  43  23  0.53 
A.3 
Does the company adhere to a local code of best 
practice? This was the question made in Spanish. 
However, the question in English also asked 
1 0  43  16  0.37 
A.4  Is the firm trading in the stock market? Survey 
question 5.  1 0  43  18  0.42 






Are full Board meetings held at least once a quarter? 
In the Spanish questionnaire it was added a question 
initially into brackets in the Enflish survey “Place also 
indicate frequency” Survey question 8 and 8.1. 
However, the question 8.1 was not scored. 
1 0  43  40  0.93 
B.2 
Are there any foreign nationals on the board? In the 
Spanhish questionnaire the question “Which 
countries do they come from?” was tumed into a 
different question. Survey question 22 and 22.1 
respectively. However, the question 22.1 was not 
scored. 
1 0  43  12  0.28 






Are members allowed to send substitutes? Since 
Colombian code of commerce allows the existence of 
substitutes, the question seems out of place. 
However, there could be situations where in a 
complete year substitutes would not attend any single 
board meeting. Survey question 10. 
1 0  43  12  0.28 
C.2 
Does the company disclose its ownership structure 
(i.e. the ownership by large shareholders? Under Law 
222 of 1995, all companies registered at the RNVI 
must fulfill this obligation. Survey question 42 
1 0  43  33  0.77 
C.3 
Do shareholders with conflicts of interest in 
transactions need to disclose the conflicts if it goes to 
a vote to the assembly? Survey question 44. 
1 0  43  22  0.51 
 
APPENDIX A-1
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX: ELEMENTS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
This table describes the final 31 elements and its summary statistics included in our overall
Corporate Governance Index for a total of forty three firms. Six firms that responded the ques-
tionnaire were eliminated.
SUBINDEX A. DISCIPLINE 4
SUBINDEX B. ACCOUNTABILITY 2
SUBINDEX C. RESPONSIBILITY 358 CORPORATE VALUATION AND GOVERNANCE: EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
Borradores de investigación - No. 71






Do the Chaiman of the Board and the CEO belong 
to the same family/controlling group? Survey 
question 12. 
1 0  43  13  0.30 
D.2  Is the Chaiman of the Board an independent, non 
affiliated director? Survey question 14.  1 0  43  18  0.42 
D.3  Are there any members of the board that are 
independent board members? Survey question 15.  1 0  43  5  0.12 
D.4 
Is any board member also board 
members/executives of firms belonging to the same 
economic group? How many members fall in this 
category? Survey question 28. 
1 0  43  29  0.67 






If a manager or a director has a conflict of interest 
in a transaction (i.e. he owns, it a director of, or 
works in a firm with whom the company is planning 
to do the transaction), does he need to disclose such 
conflict? Survey question 23. 
0 -1  43  33  0.77 
E.2 
Does he need to get out of the room for the 
deliberations on the transaction to take place? 
Survey question 23.1 
0 -1  43  18  0.42 
E.3  Does the company disclose executive compensation 
and benefits? Survey question 24.  1 0  43  23  0.58 
E.4  Does the company disclose board compensation 
and benefits? Survey question 25.  1 0  43  36  0.84 
E.5 
Does the company publish its Annual Report within 
four months of the end of the financial year? Survey 
question 56. 
1 0  43  38  0.88 
E.6 
57. Does the company publish/announce 
semiannual reports within two months of the end of 
the half-year? Survey question 57. 
1 0  43  29  0.67 
E.7 
Does the company publish/announce quarterly 
reports within two months of the end of the 
quarter? Survey question 58. 
1 0  43  38  0.88 
E.8 
Has the public announcement of results been no 
longer than two working days ot the Board meeting? 
Survey question 59. 
1 0  43  15  0.35 
E.9  Has management disclosed three years performance 
targets? Survey question 60.  1 0  43  14  0.33 
E.10 
Has the company hired its external auditors for 
consulting purposes in the last three years? Survey 
question 62. 
-1 0  43  25  0.58 
E.11 
Does the company have a website where results and 
other announcements are updated promptly (no 
later than one business day)? Survey question 63. 
1 0  43  20  0.47 
E.12  Does the company disclose ownership information? 
Survey question 64.  1 0  43  30  0.70 
E.13 
Does the company disclose related party transaction 
and/or conflicts of interest of managers and 
directors on the board? Survey question 67. 
1 0  43  24  0.56 
 
SUBINDEX D. INDEPENDENCE 4
SUBINDEX E. TRANSPARENCY 13LUIS H. GUTIÉRREZ R., CARLOS POMBO V. 59
Julio de 2005






What percentaje of the shares is needed to call an 
Extraordinary Shareholders meeting? Under Law 222 
of 1995, the minimum percentage to call ESM is 
25%. However companies can opt out by 
determining a lower percentage. So, a one was 
assigned for those responses wiht percentage lower 
than 25%. Survey question 40 
1   43  11  0.26 
F.2 
Can shareholders ask management to include items in 
the list of topics to be dealt with during the 
shareholders’meetings? Survey question 41. 
1 0  43  33  0.77 
F.3  Can minority shareholders add agenda items to the 
meeting? Survey question 41.1  1 0  43  30  0.70 
F.4 
Do minority shareholders have rights of firs refusal to 
purchase additional shares at the same price they are 
offered to a third party? Survey question 49. 
1 0  43  13  0.30 
F.5 
Can minority shareholders have tag-along rights to 
sell shares at the same price as the controlling 
shareholder when the company is sold? Survey 
question 51. 
1 0  43  26  0.60 
SUBINDEX F. FAIRNESS 5